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Article

GUANTANAMO, BOUMEDIENE, AND
JURISDICTION-STRIPPING: THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENT MEETS THE IMPERIAL COURT
Martin J. Katz*

INTRODUCTION
In Boumediene v. Bush, 1 the Supreme Court struck down a
major pillar of President Bush's war on terror: the indefinite detention of terror suspects in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Court
held that even non-citizen prisoners held by the United States
government on foreign soil could challenge their confinement by
seeking a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, and that the
procedures the government had provided for such challenges
were not an adequate substitute for the writ."
As a habeas corpus case, Boumediene may well be revolutionary.3 However, Boumediene is more than merely a habeas
* Interim Dean and Associate Professor of Law. University of Denver College of
Law; Yale Law School. J.D. 1991: Harvard College. A.B. 1987. Thanks to Alan Chen.
Laurence Claus. Richard Fallon. Scott Moss. and James Pfander. as well as to the Colorado Employment Law Faculty (Rachel Arnow-Richman. Roberta Corrada. Helen Norton. and Nantiya Ruan) for their comments on drafts. Any errors are my own. The author served as counsel in the jurisdiction-stripping case. Painter v. Sha/ala. 97 F.3d 1351
(lOth Cir. 1996).
1. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
2. See id. at 2340.
3. See id. at 2293-94 (Scalia. J .. dissenting) ("Today. for the first time in our Nation's history. the Court confers a constitutional right to habeas corpus on alien enemies
detained abroad by our military forces in the course of an ongoing war."): see also Glenn
Sulmasy. The Supreme Court Made a Mistake in Boumediene. U.S. NEWS. June 19.2008.
The Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in Boumediene v. Bush last week justifiably
sent shock waves through the legal community. The majority opinion. authored
by the ever wandering Justice Anthony Kennedy. disregarded both centuries of
precedent and the military deference doctrine and also intruded on what is

377

378

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 25:377

corpus case. This Article will argue that, at its core, Boumediene
should be understood as a case about separation of powers.
More specifically, it should be understood as a case about the
Court's vision of separation of powers-a vision in which federal
courts serve to keep the political branches within the bounds of
the Constitution and, most importantly, in which the political
branches cannot evade judicial review by manipulating jurisdiction. Hence, this Article will argue, the principles set out in
Boumediene have significant implications for Congress's ability
to restrict or eliminate the jurisdiction of the federal courts-a
practice known as jurisdiction-stripping, which has been the subject of an intense, long-running debate among the giants of constitutionallaw.4
In Boumediene, the Court asserted a forceful view of judicial power that it has hesitated to assert since the Founding. The
Court's newfound willingness to assert this power may be criticized as an exercise in judicial imperialism. But it also reflects a
healthy inclination to counterbalance several recent, unprecedented assertions of power by the President, accompanied by
apparent acquiescence from Congress.
This Article will first summarize the long-running debate
over jurisdiction-stripping. It will then show how the principles
articulated in Boumediene suggest at least a partial resolution of
that debate. Next, it will show that the resolution suggested by
Boumediene is not limited to habeas cases-cases involving detention; rather, Boumediene speaks to jurisdiction-stripping
more generally. Finally, the Article will discuss the extraordinary
significance of the fact that the Court has articulated these principles now, after avoiding doing so for centuries. It will conclude
that this timing is neither coincidental nor the product of an opportunistic judicial power grab. Rather, Boumediene represents
a timely restoration of a healthy balance of power.

clearly the province of the political branches. As a result of this case. Guantanamo Bay detainees now formally have more rights than do prisoners of war
under the Geneva Conventions.
Bw see Daniel R. Williams, Who Got Game? Boumediene v. Bush and the Judicial Gamesmanship of Enemy-Combatant Detention, 43 NEW ENGL. L. REV. 1 (2008) (criticizing
Boumediene as focused exclusively on process, rather than imposing substantive limitations on the government). Other commentators have focused on the globalist aspects of
the case. See, e.g.. David Cole. Rights over Borders: Transnational Constitutionalism and
Guantanamo Bay. CATO S. CT. REV. 47 (2007/2008): Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution after Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259 (2009).
4. See infra note 13.
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I. A VERY BRIEF PRIMER ON JURISDICTIONSTRIPPING: THREE QUESTIONS-FEW ANSWERS

Ever since the Supreme Court declared that it had the power to review acts of Congress and the President for constitutionality more than 200 years ago,; legal thinkers have wondered
whether Congress could control this power by restricting the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The question has tended to come
up most visibly in two contexts.fi
First, in the wake of controversial federal court decisions,
opponents have occasionally proposed laws to strip the federal
courts of jurisdiction to hear the type of case that had been at issue (presumably with the idea that state courts will ignore or
7
refuse to apply the controversial precedent). For example, after
the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, providing constitutional protection for a right to abortion, some legislators proposed legislation that would strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear those cases.~ Similar legislation has been proposed in
5. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
6. Actually. this issue also comes up in a third context: In administrative law statutes. which occasionally attempt to preclude judicial review of certain types of administrative actions. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(i)(1) (precluding judicial review of agency's
determination of Medicare "conversion factor"); Painter v. Shalala. 97 F.3d 1351 (lOth
Cir. 1996) (upholding that jurisdiction-stripping statute as constitutional). For a comprehensive study of the more recent occasions on which Congress has curtailed federal court
jurisdiction. see Benjamin Keele. Ganging Up Against the Courts: Congressional Curtailment of Judicial Review, 1988-2004. 7 PI SIGMA ALPHA UNDERGRADUATE J. POL.
174 (2007); see also Helen L. Norton. Reshaping Federal Jurisdiction: Congress's Latest
Challenge to Judicial Review. 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1003 (2006) (cataloguing and
analyzing recent jurisdiction-stripping bills).
7. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
152 (3d ed. 2006); James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the
Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation. 101 N.W. U. L. REV. 191. 193-94
(2007) (discussing modern jurisdiction-stripping proposals and suggesting that they
represent "something of a watershed" in the level of antagonism expressed by Congress
toward the courts). There is. of course, an irony in the use of jurisdiction-stripping as a
method of dealing with unpopular court decisions: Even if Congress successfully removed jurisdiction from some or all courts. the unpopular decision would remain on the
books-the law of the land. However. the point of this type of jurisdiction-stripping can
be seen either ( 1) as an attempt to limit the damage done by the unpopular decision by
precluding other courts from applying that precedent to new cases. or (2) as an invitation
to state courts or the political branches to ignore that precedent by removing the possibility that their decisions would be reviewed. In fact, one recent proposal (which did not
become law) went so far as to provide that any decision by a federal court covered by its
jurisdiction-stripping provision would "not [be] binding precedent on any state court."
See Constitutional Restoration Act of 2005. S. 520. 109th Cong .. § 301 (2005).
8. See, e.g.. S. 158. 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 867, 97th Cong. (1981) (proposed bills
restricting federal jurisdiction in abortion cases). There have even been calls for stripping
the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear abortion cases in the academy. See, e.g., Jason S.
Greenwood, Comment. Congressional Control of Federal Court Jurisdiction: The Case
Study of Abortion, 54 S.C. L. REV. 1069 (2003).
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response to decisions on school busing, loyalty oaths, school
prayer, reapportionment, and the pledge of allegiance. 9 Notably,
in this context, while the constitutionality of such legislation has
been hotly debated, such legislation has rarely if ever been
passed-perhaps as a result of Congressional doubt regarding
the constitutionality, or at least the wisdom, of such legislation. 10
A second context in which jurisdiction-stripping has been
proposed-and actually passed-is during times of armed conflict. During such times, Congress has occasionally attempted to
restrict federal court jurisdiction as a way to maximize the President's ability to wage war-for example, permitting him to detain those seen as an impediment to the war effort. 11 It was a statute such as this that was at issue in Boumediene. In the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2004 and Military Commission Act
12
of 2006, Congress (1) created a non-judicial procedure for determining whether certain individuals are "enemy combatants,"
and thus subject to detention, and (2) limited the ability of the
federal courts to review such determinations.
Generally, when Congress has passed, or even proposed, jurisdiction-stripping legislation, it has spawned debate over
whether such legislation is or would be constitutional. This debate has engaged the minds of many of the country's finest constitutional scholars. 13
9. See, e.g.. Pledge Protection Act of 2005. H.R. 2389. 109th Cong. (2005) (pledge
of allegiance); S. 481. 97th Cong.; H.R. 4756. 97th Cong. (1981) (school prayer); Student
Transportation Moratorium Act of 1972. S. 3388. 92d Cong.; H.R. 13916. 92d Cong.
(1972) (school busing); Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1972. S. 3395. 92d Cong.;
H.R. 13915. 92d Cong. (1972) (school busing); H.R. 11926. 88th Cong. (1964) (reapportionment); S. 3386. 85th Cong. (1958) (loyalty oaths); see also Scott Moss. An Appeal by
Any Other Name: Congress's Empty Victory Over Habeas Rights, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 249. 249 (1997) (noting that Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996. Pub. L. 104-132. 110 Stat. 1214. 1217-26 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.
and 21 U.S.C.) (1996). was a jurisdiction-restrictive response to court's perceived mollycoddling of convicted killers)
10. See RICHARD H. FALLON. JR .. ET AL.. HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 322 (5th ed. 2003) ("At least since the 1930s. no bill
that has been interpreted to withdraw all federal court jurisdiction with respect to a particular substantive area has become law.") (citation omitted) [hereinafter HART &
WECHSLER].
11. See, e.g.. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006) (limiting
federal court jurisdiction to hear claims by enemy combatants); Ex Parte McCardle, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869) (upholding law striking down one basis for Supreme Court jurisdiction).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006).
13. See HART & WECHSLER. supra note 10, at 322 ("[D]ebates about the constitutionality of legislation withdrawing federal jurisdiction as a signal of substantive disagreement have spawned a body of literature that has been described as 'choking on redundancy."') (citation omitted); Moss. supra note 9, at 250 (referring to jurisdiction-
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It is beyond the scope of this Article to revisit the debates of
these constitutional scholars. My purpose here is not to weigh in
on the question of how courts should address jurisdictionstripping statutes (though this Article does implicate that issue).
Rather, my purpose here is to address how the Supreme Courtafter centuries of largely avoiding the debate-has now suggested answers to certain fundamental questions in that debate.
Accordingly, this Part will identify some of the fundamental
questions in that debate.
The primary question is when, if ever, Congress can strip jurisdiction from the federal courts. However, for Congress to be
able to do this, it would need to exercise two distinct powers:
(1) the power to strip jurisdiction from the lower federal courts,
and (2) the power to strip appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court. So this section will begin by examining both of
those powers before examining whether Congress can combine
14
those powers in order to preclude all federal court jurisdiction.
stripping debate as ''a cottage industry"). While the debate may be thick. it includes important articles by many of the "greats" of modem constitutional law. See, e.g.. Akhil
Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985): Paul M. Bator. Congressional Power Over the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030 (1982): Steven G. Calabresi &
Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions:
A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia. 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002 (2007): Laurence
Claus, The One Court that Congress Cannot Take Away: Singularity, Supremacy, and Article III, 96 GEO. L.J. 59 (2007): Robert N. Clinton. A Mandatory View of Federal Court
Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III. 132 U. PA. L.
REv. 741 (1984): Theodore Eisenberg, Constitutional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal
Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974): Richard H. Fallon, Jr.. Some Confusions
About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV.
309 (1993); Gerald Gunther. Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction:
An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984): Henry M.
Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise
in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Daniel J. Meltzer. The History and Structure
of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569 (1990); James E. Pfander. Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States. 118 HARV. L. REV. 643
(2004); Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960); Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power
to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination. 27 VILL. L. REV. 900 (1982): Ronald D. Rotunda. Congressional Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts and the Problem
of School Busing, 64 GEO. L.J. 839 (1976): Lawrence Gene Sager. Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts. 95 HARV. L.
REV. 17 (1981): Laurence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored
Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 129 (1981); William W.
Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229 (1973): Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001 (1965).
14. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 330 (listing these issues). Hart &
Wechsler also list three additional issues: (1) jurisdiction-stripping statutes that leave
state courts available to hear cases (an issue I discuss below, see infra notes 103-107 and
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This Part will also show how the Court has gone to great lengths
to avoid providing definitive answers to these questions (particularly to the question of the ability of Congress to preclude all
federal court jurisdiction).
A. STRIPPING JURISDICTION FROM LOWER FEDERAL COURTS

The first question in the jurisdiction-stripping debate is
whether Congress can restrict the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts (district courts and circuit courts) to hear a particular
type of case. This question assumes that only the lower federal
cour~s ~re_ cl?sed- th~t t?e Su~,reme Court's original and appellate JUriSdictiOn remams mtact. ·
Proponents of allowing this form of jurisdiction-stripping
point to the text of Article III, which gives Congress the power
to "ordain and establish" lower federal courts. 16 The argument is
that (1) the Ordain and Establish Clause gave Congress discretion over whether to create lower federal courts, and (2) if Congress could decline to create lower federal courts, then Congress
17
can limit such courts' jurisdiction.
Most commentators today seem to accept the basic idea that
the Ordain and Establish Clause permits Congress to restrict or
even eliminate the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. 1R
accompanying text). (2) jurisdiction-stripping statutes that leave Article I administrative
courts to hear cases (an issue I discuss below, see infra note 107). and (3) statutes which
apportion jurisdiction among federal courts (an issue that is not implicated by Boumediene. which I therefore do not address). See id. Nor do I address the possibility of Congress attempting to preclude the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. There would
seem to be no textual basis for such an action and, perhaps for that reason. no one appears to have suggested such a possibility.
15. Much of the commentary regarding stripping lower federal court jurisdiction
also assumes the availability of state courts to hear cases. possibly with appellate review
by the U.S. Supreme court. See, e.g.. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 342-34; Hart,
supra note 13; Meltzer. supra note 13. at 1627; Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor
Sager. 77 N.W. L Rev. 143. 157 (1982). The importance of this assumption will be discussed below. See infra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
16. See U.S. CONST. art. III.§ 1 (vesting judicial power in '"one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish").
17. See Bator. supra note 13. at 1030 (explaining argument). As Professor Bator
noted. it is not just the "ordain and establish" clause that supports this argument. The
argument is also supported by the Madisonian Compromise. which is reflected in that
clause-that is. the idea that Congress would have the power to decide whether or not to
create lower federal courts. See id.
18. See, e.g.. id. at 1030; Charles E. Rice, Congress and the Supreme Court's Jurisdiction. 27 VILL L REV. 959. 960-62 (1982) (arguing that Congress has discretion to curtail lower court jurisdiction based on the Ordain and Establish Clause); see also Gunther.
supra note 13. at 912 (noting the difficulty of refuting the "ordain and establish" argument and also noting that the argument is "widely supported" by commentators). But see
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Some of these commentators have also suggested that there
might be limits on this power. For example, nearly all commentators have suggested that the "ordain and establish" power is
limited by substantive provisions elsewhere in the Constitution,
such as the Equal Protection Clause; so Congress could not, for
example, preclude jurisdiction only over cases brought by African Americans or Catholics.'y Also, as noted above, most of the
commentators who believe Congress has the power to limit lower federal court jurisdiction assume that some alternative court
would remain open to hear the cases in question-an assumption
which is likely incorrect in a case like Boumediene. 20 But subject
2
to these two potentiallimits, ' the "traditional view" is that Congress can exercise its "ordain and establish" power to close lower
federal courts. 22
The courts, too, 23 seem largely to accept the "traditional
view"- that Congress has the power to restrict lower federal
court jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has, on at least five occasions, suggested that Congress can limit lower federal court jurisdiction pursuant to the Ordain and Establish Clause. ~ However, none of these cases appears to have tested the potential
2

Eisenberg. supra note 13 (arguing that. in modern times. Congress could not decline to
establish lower federal courts): Gordon G. Young. A Critical Reassessment of the Case
Law Bearing on Congress's Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal
Courts. 54 MD. L. REV. 132. 137 (1995) (arguing that precedents do not support. and may
even limit. the traditional view of Congress's "ordain and establish" power).
19. See, e.g., Bator. supra note 13. at 1034: Gunther. supra note 13. at 916-22: see
also Bolling v. Sharpe. 347 U.S. 497. 500 (1954) (observing that the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause contains an Equal Protection component. applicable against the federal government): Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress
and Federal Jurisdiction. 85 N.W. U. L. REV. 1. 6 n.27 (1990) (finding nearly universal
agreement as to the invalidity of jurisdictional exclusion of cases brought by members of
traditionally suspect classes):.
20. See supra note 15. In Section I.C .. I will address what happens when no other
federal court is left open. I will address the role of state courts in Section II.B.l.b.
21. At least one commentator has suggested a third potential limit on the "ordain
and establish" power. See, e.g .. Tribe. supra note 13. at 142-43 (arguing that it would be
problematic for Congress to use its "ordain and establish" power selectively-i.e .. to disfavor certain rights-even when other courts might remain available). This idea seems to
have gained more traction in discussions about Congressional power to strip all federal
jurisdiction. See infra note 41.
22. See Young. supra note 18. at 137 (referring to expansive view of "ordain and
establish" power as the "traditional view").
23. I discuss the commentators· view before the courts' view because the former are
far more numerous and detailed. As I note in the text below. one of the important aspects of jurisdiction-stripping jurisprudence is its paucity. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text: see also note 25 and text following note 35.
24. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States. 321 U.S. 414 (1944): Lockerty v. Phillips. 319
U.S. 182 (1943): Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co .. 303 U.S. 323 (1938): Kline v. Burke Constr.
Co .. 260 U.S. 226 (1922): Sheldon v. Sill. 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
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limits on the exercise of this power." As I will discuss below,
Boumediene suggests such a limit.c6
B. STRIPPING THE SUPREME COURT'S APPELLATE
JURISDICfiON

The second question in the jurisdiction-stripping debate is
whether Congress can strip the Supreme Court of its appellate
jurisdiction. This question assumes that the lower federal courts,
as well as the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, remain
'7
open:
The idea that Congress can strip the Supreme Court of its
appellate jurisdiction flows primarily from the text of Article III,
which gives Congress the power to make "Exceptions, and ...
Regulations" to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 2H At
least some commentators have gone beyond this simple textual
argument to suggest a structural purpose underlying this textual
provision: that the Framers included this language to provide

25. Most of those cases involved statutes that channeled jurisdiction to a particular
lower federal court. rather than statutes that stripped jurisdiction from all lower federal
courts. See, e.g .. Yakus v. United States. 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (upholding requirement that
appeals in price control cases be filed in designated emergency court of appeals): Lockerty v. Phillips. 319 U.S. 182 (1943) (same). Others of these cases involved a limitation on
remedies. rather than a limit on lower courts' ability to hear cases. See, e.g., Lauf v. E.G.
Shinner & Co .. 303 U.S. 323 (1938) (upholding limit on lower courts' ability to issue injunctions): Kline v. Burke Construction Co .. 260 U.S. 226 (1922) (same). And others involved limits on lower federal courts' ability to hear state common law claims. as opposed to federal statutory or constitutional claims. See, e.g., Kline v. Burke Constr. Co ..
260 U.S. 226 (1922) (upholding limit on lower federal courts' ability to issue injunctions
against state courts in common law contract claims): Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441
(1850) (upholding limit on lower federal courts to hear diversity suits where diversity was
created by assignment of a contract). So none of these cases tested whether there is a limit on Congress's ability to strip lower federal court jurisdiction where no state court remains available to hear the case. See generally Young. supra note 18 (questioning whether any of these precedents support a broad Congressional power to strip lower federal
court jurisdiction).
26. See infra Section II.B.2. (arguing that Boumediene limits Congress's power to
close lower federal courts to cases where a competent factfinder remains available): Section II.C.2. (arguing that this principle applies in all constitutional cases that are factdependent).
27. Some commentators in this debate assume that state courts would remain open.
as well. See e.g. Hart. supra note 13 (elaborating on the need for state court uniformity in
approaches to federal law): Ratner. supra note 13. at 201-{)2 (explaining need for Supreme Court to keep state courts in check and unify their positions on federal law). The
importance of this assumption will be discussed below. See infra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
28. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2 ("In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions.
and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.").
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Congress with a means to check the power of the Supreme
29
Court.
Most commentators accept the idea that the Exceptions
Clause permits Congress to exercise such control over the Su30
preme Court's appellate jurisdiction. However, some notable
commentators have suggested that there might be some limits on
this power. For example, Professor Hart argued that Congress
cannot use this power to destroy the "essential functions" of the
Supreme Court, which include maintaining the supremacy and
uniformity of federal law. 31 Others have suggested that, at least
in certain types of cases, Congress cannot use its Exceptions
Clause power in a way that would foreclose all avenues to the
32
Supreme Court.
As with the issue of lower court jurisdiction-stripping, the
Supreme Court has only occasionally weighed in on the issue of
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction-stripping." The Court has
said several times that Congress can use its Exceptions Clause
29. See, e.g., Wechsler supra note 13. at 1005-D6.
30. See generally Bator. supra note 13; Gunther. supra note 13; Van Alstyne. supra
note 13; Wechsler supra note 13. at 1005-D6. A few commentators have rejected the ar-

gument. suggesting that the "regulations and exceptions" language was intended to modify the phrase "findings of fact"- that is. that Congress's power is limited to regulating the
Court's review of findings of fact. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER. CONGRESS V. THE
SUPREME COURT 285-96 (1969); Henry J. Merry. Scope of the Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction: Historical Basis. 47 MINN. L. REV. 53 (1962). But see HART &
WECHSLER. supra note 10. at 337 n.ll ("[T]his revisionist view (advanced by Professors
Berger and Merry] has attracted little support."). More recently, the idea that the power
to make "exceptions" means a power to strip jurisdiction has been challenged by textualisis. who argue that this language is best understood merely as permitting Congress to
move certain issues between the Court's original and appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g., Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 13, at 1008; Claus. supra note 13, at 114. See also James E.
Pfander. Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court's Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals. 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1441-42 (2000) (arguing that "exceptions" power might
give Congress power to preclude the Court from hearing as-of-right cases. but it does not
give Congress power to preclude the Court's supervisory powers, which are generally
issued through discretionary writs. such as habeas corpus and mandamus).
31. See generally Hart, supra note 13 (arguing that Congress must leave intact the
"essential functions" of the Court); Ratner, supra note 13, at 201-D2 (explaining that "essential functions" include "maintaining the uniformity and supremacy of federal law").
But see Gunther, supra note 13. at 920 (noting that the "essential functions" argument
begs the question of what are the Court's "'essential functions" and confuses the familiar
with the necessary): Wechsler, supra note 13, at 1005-{)6 (rejecting "essential functions"
argument).
32. See generally Richard H. Fallon. Jr.. Applying the Suspension Clause to Immigration Cases. 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1068 (1998): Ratner. supra note 13: Sager. supra note
13; Tribe, supra note 13. Although these commentators have spoken of the need to maintain a route to the Supreme Court. it may be that it would be sufficient to leave some
federal court open. See infra Section II.B.l.b.
33. Again. I discuss the Court's response after that of the commentators because of
the paucity of guidance from the Court. See supra note 23.
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power to restrict the Court's appellate jurisdiction. 34 However, in
repeated dicta, the Court appears to have endorsed one limit on
this power: Congress may need to leave open some avenue by
which certain types of cases can be litigated in federal court (and
possibly the Supreme Court)." But the Court never actually
struck down a law limiting its appellate jurisdiction on these
grounds- until Boumediene.
C. STRIPPING ALL FEDERAL JURISDICTION

The most difficult question in the jurisdiction-stripping debate is whether Congress can preclude all federal court jurisdiction (other than the Supreme Court's narrow original jurisdiction). Put differently, assuming that Congress can eliminate the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts and the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, under what circumstances, if any, can
Congress do both of these things at the same time? 36
The support for this form of jurisdiction-stripping derives
from the fact that, assuming Congress can eliminate lower court
jurisdiction and Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, nothing in
the text of the Constitution seems to preclude Congress from
37
doing both of these things at once. This form of jurisdiction34. See. e.g.. Felker v. Turpin. 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (maintaining the limit on the
Court's appellate jurisdiction on the basis of the Exceptions Clause); Ex Parte McCardle.
74 C.S. (7 Wall.) 506. 513-14 (1869) (upholding statute that limited Court's appellate jurisdiction on basis of Exceptions Clause).
35. See, e.g.. id. at 515 (noting that jurisdiction-stripping statute may have been
more problematic if it had foreclosed all routes to the Court); Felker. at 651 (reaching the
same conclusion as the court in McCardle). At least one Justice also appears to have provided a nod in dicta to Professor Hart's "'essential function"' limit. In a concurrence in
Felker. Justice Souter noted that it was an "'open"' question whether Congress could use
its Exceptions Clause power to shut down all avenues to the Court, specifically citing
Professor Hart's articulation of an '"essential functions' limitation on the Exceptions
Clause ... See id. at 667 (Souter. J.. concurring). But the Court as a whole has never addressed this issue.
36. Most of the commentators in this debate have assumed that. even if Congress
closed all federal courts. state courts would remain open. See, e.g., Meltzer. supra note 13.
at 1627 (introducing the idea that state courts must hear cases if federal jurisdictions are
stripped of their power to do so); Martin H. Reddish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional
Power to Control the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a
Ne"· Svnthesis. 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1975) (explaining that Congress cannot close all
federal courts unless state court is available); Redish. supra note 15. at 155 (arguing in
favor of Congressional power to strip all federal jurisdiction assumes state courts or some
other independent body available to hear cases): see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel
J. Meltzer. New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARY. L.
REV. 1731. 2039 (1991) (elaborating that "'some court"' must remain available). The implications of this assumption will be discussed below. See infra notes 104-107 and accompanying text.
37. Notably. the modern textual argument against total federal jurisdiction-

2009] BOUMEDIENE AND THE IMPERIAL COURT

387

stripping may also find support in a checks-and-balances concept: The argument is that the Framers consciously provided
these forms of power to Congress as a way to permit it to check
the judiciary.'H
Here, the commentators seem to be more split than on the
prior two questions. Some have argued that Congress can preclude all federal jurisdiction with few, if any, limits.'y Others have
rejected this position, arguing that Congress must vest jurisdic40
tion in some federal court.
Still others have taken the position that Congress can curtail
federal court jurisdiction, but subject to significant limitations.
For example, Professors Sager and Claus have suggested that
Congress cannot selectivel~ strip jurisdiction in a manner that
4
disfavors particular rights. Professor Amar has suggested that
Congress cannot preclude federal courts from hearing matters
4
that fall within the list of "cases" set out in Article 111. "

stripping attacks one of the two powers-the idea that the ··exceptions" power permits
Congress to preclude Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. See. e.g., Calabresi & Lawson. supra note 13. at 1008; Claus. supra note 13, at 114. This argument is not an argument against combining powers. Rather. it is an argument that one of the two purported
powers does not exist.
38. See, e.g., Charles Black. The Presidency and Congress. 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
841. 846 (1975) (congressional control of federal court jurisdiction "is the rock on which
rests the legitimacy of the judicial work in a democracy"). But see Claus. supra note 13. at
87-88 (disagreeing with Professor Black) and 88-97 (offering different account of framers' intent); Sager, supra note 13, at 38 (noting that this approach "is at odds with the
position that Congress cannot use jurisdiction to undermine the decisions of the Supreme
Court").
39. See, e.g., William R. Casto. The First Congress's Understanding of Its Authority
over the Federal Courts' Jurisdiction. 26 B.C. L. REV. 1101 (1985): Meltzer, supra note 13.
at 1627: Redish. supra note 15. at 155: see also Pfander. supra note 7. at 195-96 (suggesting that "recent scholarship ... points to an emerging orthodox consensus" that "Congress has relatively broad power over" federal courts' jurisdiction). I say "with few. if
any.limits" because. as will be discussed below. almost all of these commentators assume
that state courts would remain available to hear cases and might feel differently about
Congress closing all federal courts if state courts were unavailable. See supra note 36. I
will discuss this assumption below. See infra notes 104-107 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., JULIUS GOEBEL. HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 240-47 (1971): Clinton. supra note
13, at 749-50; Eisenberg, supra note 13. This position actually seems to have originated in
dicta by Justice Story. See infra note 48.
41. See, e.g., Claus, supra note 13 at 67 (arguing that. at the very least. Congress
must not engage in issue-specific jurisdiction-stripping): Sager. supra note 13. at 70 (Congress cannot exercise its jurisdiction-stripping power in a way that disfavors particular
constitutional rights); see also Tribe. supra note 13 (decrying jurisdictional gerrymandering of lower court jurisdiction). But see Redish, supra note 15. at 143 (issue-specific jurisdiction-stripping is permissible).
42. See generally Amar. supra note 13. But see Meltzer. supra note 13. at 1627 (disagreeing with Professor Amar on this point).
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Most important for purposes of this Article is a limit proposed by Professor Sager, and also by Professors Fallon and
Meltzer: Congress cannot preclude federal courts from hearing
43
constitutional claims. Varying justifications have been offered
for this proposition. For example, some commentators have
grounded this limit in the Due Process Clause. 44 Professor Sager
bases this proposition on what he terms "the constitutional
commitment to a radically independent federal judiciary," which
he finds in Article III's salary and tenure protections for federal
45
judges. But the most important justification for this limit for
purposes of understanding Boumediene is the one offered by
Professors Fallon and Meltzer: Courts must remain available to
adjudicate constitutional claims in order to "keep government
46
generally within the bounds of law. "
47
The courts have seemed particularly hesitant to decide
whether Congress can strip all federal courts of jurisdiction-at
least until Boumediene. 48 They have adopted and applied a
43. See, e.g., Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 36, at 1778-79; Sager, supra note 13. at
66. But see Redish. supra note 15. at 155 (disagreeing that Congress must provide a federal court to resolve constitutional claims) (emphasis added). The possibility a state court
could serve this purpose will be discussed below. See infra notes 104-107 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Redish, supra 15. at 158-59 (explaining that the Due Process clause
requires that court be available to hear all claims involving deprivations of life. liberty. or
property). But see id. at 155 (that court need not be a federal court; it could be a state
court). Notably. the Due Process argument would protect jurisdiction over only a subset
of constitutional claims: those involving life, liberty, or property. Unless "liberty" were
seen as co-extensive with all constitutional rights, this theory would not require federal
jurisdiction over all constitutional claims. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 503 (explaining that most. but not all. of the Bill of Rights have been considered "liberty" interests for purposes of incorporating them against states). A more modest variation on the
principle that Congress must leave open a federal court in all constitutional cases or all
Due Process Clause cases is the idea that a federal court must remain available to hear
claims of a constitutional right to process. See Hart. supra note 13, at 1372.
45. See, e.g., Sager. supra note 13, at 65.
46. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 43. at 1778-79; see also Claus. supra note 13, at
64 (noting separation of powers issues inherent in an expansive reading of the Exceptions
Clause). I say that this is the most important argument for our purposes because, as we
will see below. it seems to be the argument that animated the Boumediene court. See infra Part II.B. As Professor Redish has pointed out, this "keeping the government in
check" argument is not necessarily limited to constitutional claims; it might apply to nonconstitutional claims. as well. See Redish, supra note 15, at 148, 152. Professor Redish's
observation in this regard will be explored further below, in note 102.
47. Once again. I discuss the courts' position last because of the paucity of judicial
guidance in this area. See supra note 23.
48. Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the question, two circuit courts
appear to have reached it, though the guidance these opinions provide is not entirely
clear. First, in Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., the Second Circuit adopted the position
that the Due Process Clause precludes stripping all federal jurisdiction in cases that involve the deprivation of property. See 169 F.2d 254. 257 (2d Cir. 1948). It is notable that
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strong avoidance doctrine, under which they have interpreted
statutes so as to avoid concluding that Congress has sought to
strip federal courts of all jurisdiction (thus avoiding the constitutional question of whether Congress can do so). In fact, in a
number of cases, the Supreme Court appears to go to greatsome might say extreme -lengths to find that Congress did not
49
intend to preclude all federal jurisdiction. For example, in INS
v. St. Cyr, the Court addressed a statute that said, "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal" of a deportable alien."'
Yet the court held that the words "judicial review" did not include habeas corpus; that habeas review remained available. 51 In
dissent, Justice Scalia accused the majority of finding "ambiguity
in utterly clear" language and "fabricat[ing] a superclear state-

the Supreme Court never got involved in this case. But. as discussed below in the text.
later Supreme Court dicta appears to endorse a variation of Bauagfia's holding: the idea
that Congress cannot strip all jurisdiction in constitutional cases. Second. in Eisenlrager v.
Forreslal. the D.C. Circuit held that the Suspension Clause precludes stripping all federal
jurisdiction in a habeas case. See 174 F.2d 961. 966 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1949). However. this
opinion was reversed on the ground that the Suspension Clause did not apply to German
nationals held in Germany. See Johnson v. Eisentrager 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (a holding
discussed at length and ultimately distinguished in Boumediene). So the Supreme Court
did not address the issue in that case.
One Supreme Court Justice has addressed the issue. albeit in dicta. Justice Story asserted that Congress could not preclude all federal jurisdiction in any case listed in Article III. whether it involved a constitutional claim or non-constitutional claim. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304. 328-31 (1816). However. no later
Supreme Court opinion appears to adopt-or even repeat-this assertion. (It was cited
as an alternative ground by the D.C. Circuit in Eisemrager. See 174 F.2d at 966 n.26. rev 'd
339 U.S. 763. But beyond that. Justice Story's assertion does not appear to have gained
much traction in the courts.)
49. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (interpreting DTA as being
non-retroactive. and thus permitting review in pending cases): Rasul v. Bush. 542 U.S.
466 (2004) (interpreting general habeas statute to permit habeas review of claims by
aliens outside the United States): INS v. St. Cyr. 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (holding that. in
precluding judicial review of immigration claims. Congress did not intend to preclude
review of habeas jurisdiction): Felker v. Turpin. 518 U.S. 651. 661 (1996) (holding that
Congress did not preclude all judicial review. since original habeas jurisdiction remained
available): Webster v. Doe. 486 U.S. 592 (1988) (holding that Congressional preclusion of
judicial review did not include preclusion of judicial review of constitutional claims): Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians. 476 U.S. 667. 681 n.12 (1986) (articulating a
similar holding to that in Websler): Johnson v. Robison. 415 U.S. 361.366--67 (1974) (explaining that jurisdiction-stripping statute did not prevent judicial review of constitutional claims): see also Pfander. supra note 7. at 195 (noting that "the Court [has] adopted
strained readings of restrictions on is appellate jurisdiction ... to avoid the constitutional
question that would arise from [such] legislation"): Ernest A. Young. Conslilllfional
Avoidance, Resislance Norms, and lhe Preservalion of Judicial Review. 78 TEX. L. REV.
1549 (2000) (discussing Court's use of avoidance doctrines to resist jurisdictionstripping).
50. 533 U.S. at 299.
51. See id. at 299-300.
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ment, 'magic words' requirement ... unparalleled in any other
area of our jurisprudence. '' 52
I will discuss the merits of the Court's avoidance doctrine
below.'' But whatever one thinks of the merits of the Court's
avoidance doctrine, there are two things that are worth noting
about it. First, as a result of that doctrine, the Court has provided little solid guidance on the question of whether Congress
can preclude all federal jurisdiction. Second, despite the lack of
solid guidance, we do find some limited guidance in the Court's
explanations for why it has worked so hard to avoid addressing
this question. Specifically, the Court's has suggested some sympathy-in a vague way-for the position that there may be some
limits on Congress's ability to strip all federal jurisdiction in constitutional cases.'~
The Court has repeatedly explained its inclination to avoid
the question of jurisdiction-stripping in the form of a warningalbeit in dicta-to Congress: If Congress really did intend to
preclude all jurisdiction over constitutional claims, the Court explains, this ''would give rise to substantial constitutional questions.""' In other words, the Court seems to be suggesting that,
while it believes Congress has substantial control over federal
jurisdiction, the Court might draw the line at total federal jurisdiction-stripping in constitutional cases.
So far, this warning has been relatively vague; the Court has
not explained the "constitutional questions" that would arise
from total federal jurisdiction-stripping in such cases. And so far,

52. See id. at 326-27 (Scalia. J .. dissenting).
53. See infra Part Ill.
54. This vague warning might arguably represent the Court's attempt to open of a
.. dialogue .. with Congress or with the people over the constitutional permissibility of jurisdiction-stripping. See Barry Friedman. Dialogue and Judicial Review. 91 MICH. L. REV.
577. 668-69 (1993) (discussing role of Court in focusing and promoting dialogue over
constitutional meaning): Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Speaking in a Judicial Voice. 67 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1185. 1198 (1992) (explaining the judicial branch's dialogue with the other
branches of government).
)). See St. Cvr. 533 U.S. at 300: see also Webster. 486 U.S at 603 Uustifying heightened intent requi~ement as means of avoiding the ... serious constitutional question· that
would arise if~ federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable
constitutional claim .. ) (citation omitted): Bowen. 476 U.S. at 681 n.12 (choosing to avoid
the .. serious constitutional question" ): Johnson. 415 U.S. at 366-D7 (articulating that the
Court must ascertain whether a construction of the statute is possible which avoids the
constitutional question). The Court has also offered similar dicta outside of the context
of its avoidance doctrine. See Zadvydas v. Davis. 533 U.S. 678. 692 (2001) ("This Court
has suggested ... that the Constitution may well preclude granting an administrative
bodv the unreviewable authority to make determinations implicating fundamental
rights .. ) (citing St. Cyr. 533 U.S. 289).
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the Court's endorsement has been limited to dicta. This all
changed in Boumediene.
II. BOUMEDIENE'S ANSWERS
This Part will show how Boumediene suggests at least a partial resolution of the jurisdiction-stripping debate. Section A will
explain the Boumediene opinion on its own terms-that is, as a case
about the habeas rights of non-citizens held abroad. Section B will
show how the Court's responses to the habeas issues before it
suggest answers to the three questions in the jurisdictionstripping debate. Section C will then show how these answers
apply to all jurisdiction-stripping cases, not just to habeas cases.
A. BOUMED/ENE ON ITS OWN TERMS

On its face, Boumediene is a case about the habeas corpus
rights of non-citizens detained abroad by the United States government. The case arose in the context of the war on terror. As
part of that effort, the Bush Administration had captured and
detained a number of individuals, claiming that they were "enemy combatants." The President had claimed that he had the
power to hold such "enemy combatants" for the duration of the
56
war on terror-perhaps indefinitely. Several of the detainees
challenged this claim. Others, including the petitioners in Boumediene, claimed that the government made a factual error; that
they were not "enemy combatants." Several such challenges, including the one in Boumediene, were made by petitioning the
federal courts for writs of habeas corpus; that is, for an order to
release the petitioners on the ground that their detentions are
illegal.
To deal with the possibility of habeas claims, the Bush Administration divided the detainees into two groups, depending
on their citizenship status and location. This is because the detainees' right to seek habeas was thought to depend on these two
criteria. U.S. citizens and those detained on U.S. soil are generally thought to have a right to seek habeas.' 7 But the Administra56. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
57. While President Bush seemed to concede that Americans or those held on
American soil had a right to habeas. he did not concede that the federal courts should
hear their cases. Rather. the President claimed that Constitution gave him exclusive or
nearly-exclusive power to decide how to prosecute an armed conflict. and that this executive power overrides or limits citizen-detainees' right to seek habeas relief from the
courts-a claim that the Court rejected in 2004 in Hamdi. See 542 U.S. 507.
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tion contended that non-citizens detained abroad did not have
that right. Accordingly, the Administration had detained anumber of non-citizens in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and claimed that
the courts cannot entertain habeas petitions by these detainees.
The initial fight over the habeas rights of non-citizens held
in Guantanamo was a statutory fight. In Rasul v. Bush, the Court
held that non-citizens detained in Guantanamo Bay had a statutory right to seek habeas relief under the general habeas statute,
28 U.S.C. Section 2241.58 Congress responded with the Detainee
Treatment Act (DTA), which amended Section 2241 to preclude
statutory habeas claims by non-citizens designated as "enemy
59
combatants." In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court held that the
DT A did not apply retroactively; that non-citizen detainees who
had already filed habeas petitions under Section 2241 could con60
tinue to pursue those claims. Once again, Congress responded,
this time with the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA),
which made clear that the DTA was intended to be retroactive. 61
This effectively precluded all avenues of statutory habeas jurisdiction for non-citizens held in Guantanamo. 62
In Boumediene, a group of non-citizen detainees in Guantanamo Bay claimed a constitutional right to habeas. The detainees claimed that, irrespective of any statute, the Suspension
Clause of the Constitution-which precludes Congress from suspending the writ of habeas corpus except in cases of rebellion or
invasion63 -provides them with a constitutional right to petition
a court for a writ of habeas corpus.
The government's first defense was that the Suspension
Clause does not apply to non-citizens held outside of the U.S. in
a place such as Guantanamo. 64 Specifically, the government ar58. See Rasul v. Bush. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
59. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006).
60. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006).
62. I say "effectively precluded" because, in Boumediene, the detainees tried to
claim that the MCA's retroactivity provisions were not intended to apply to habeas
claims (a distinction similar to the one adopted by the Court in St. Cyr, see 533 U.S. at
299-300). However. in Boumediene, the Court swiftly rejected this claim. See Boumediene. at 2242-44.
63. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9. In this case, Congress did not try to suspend the writ.
But see Jonathan Alter. Keeping Order in the Courts, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 10, 2001, at 48
("When Attorney General John Ashcroft sent the secret first draft of the antiterrorism
bill to Capitol Hill in October [2001]. it contained a section explicitly titled: 'Suspension
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus."'). For an interesting discussion of whether Congress
could do so. see Amanda Tyler. Suspension as an Emergency Power. 118 Yale L.J.
(forthcoming 2009).
64. See Boumediene. at 2244.
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gued (1) that the lease agreement between the U.S. and Cuba
regarding the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station makes Cuba sovereign over that location, and (2) that the Suspension Clause does
not apply in places where another country maintains sovereignty; a sovereignty-based test. 65 The Court accepted the government's first contention (that Cuba maintained sovereignty over
Guantanamo ).66 But it rejected the government's second contention, holding for the first time that the Suspension Clause-and
therefore a constitutional right to habeas- applies to certain
non-citizens held abroad. 67 Specifically, it held that the Clause
68
applied in Guantanamo.
The Court based this holding primarily on an argument
69
about separation of powers. The Court noted that the government's proposed sovereignty-based test would essentially permit
the government to "switch the Constitution on or off at will"
70
based on the agreements it might enter with host countries.
This, the Court held, would violate the concept of separation of
powers: "The test for determining the scope of [the Suspension
Clause] must not be subject to manipulation by those whose
71
power it is designed to restrain." Rather, the Court held, the
scope of the Suspension Clause must be determined by the
courts: The courts, not the political branches, are supposed to
72
say "what the law is. "
Then, having rejected the government's proposed sovereignty-based test for determining the where the Suspension
Clause applies, the Court looked at its precedents to derive an
See id. at 2252.
See id.
See id. at 2262. At least one commentator has argued that the constitutional
right to habeas derives from Article IlL not the Suspension Clause. See Claus. supra note
13. at 109-113. However. the Boumediene Court seemed to assume that the constitutional right to habeas was implied by the Suspension Clause. See Boumediene. 128 S. Ct. at
65.
66.
67.

2262.
68.
69.

See id.
The Court's opinion also contains a lengthy examination of the history of habeas corpus both prior and subsequent to the Founding. See id. at 2244-51. However. at
the end of this discussion, the Court concludes that this history is non-dispositive. See id.
at 2249, 2251. Notably. what the Court does glean from this discussion is the notion that.
as a historical matter. the writ has largely been understood as a mechanism for separating
powers-a way for courts to check the excesses of the executive. See id. at 2246. 2247.
Additionally. as discussed in the text below. the Court relied on precedent to frame its
test for the places in which the Suspension Clause would apply to non-citizens. However.
this discussion occurred only after the Court had rejected the government's proposed
sovereignty-based test.
70. See id. at 2259.
71. Seeid.
72. See id.

394

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 25:377

73
alternative test. In applying that test, the Court concluded that
Guantanamo was the type of place in which the Suspension
74
Clause applied.
The government also advanced the alternative argument
that, even if the Suspension Clause did apply to non-citizens at
Guantanamo, the procedures provided by the DTA serve as an
adequate substitute for the writ. 75 The DTA provides two stages
of review: First, a detainee gets a hearing in front of a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT), established by the Defense
76
Department. Then, the detainee can challenge the CSRT's determination in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.77
The Court held that this procedure did not provide an adequate substitute for habeas. It began by noting that "the necessary scope of habeas review [or a proposed substitute for habeas]
in part depends upon the rigor of any earlier proceedings. " 78 The
Court then noted several shortcomings in the earlier CSRT procedures. including the fact that detainees do not have the assistance of counsel, have limited means to find and present evidence that they are not enemy combatants, and may not even be
aware of the most critical allegations relied upon by the government.79 The Court remarked that these shortcomings posed a
"considerable risk of error," and held that "the court that conducts the habeas proceeding [or its substitute] must have the
means to correct errors that occurred during the CSRT proceedings. ,HI, The Court then noted several limitations that the DT A
places upon the D.C. Circuit's ability to correct such errors, includini the court's inability to consider newly discovered evidence. 1 As a result of these limitations, the Court held that the
82
DT A did not provide an adequate substitute for habeas.
Because the Suspension Clause applied and because Congress had neither sought to suspend the writ nor provided an
adequate substitute for the writ, the Court held in favor of the

73.
74.
75.
76.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See id. at 2259.
See id. at 2262.
See id. at 2262.
See id. at 2241.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006).
See Boumediene. at 2268.
See id. at 2269.
See id. at 2270.
See id. at 2272.
See id. at 2274.
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detainees. It ordered the lower courts to hear habeas cases
1
brought by such detainees.H
B. BOUMEDIENE AS A JURISDICTION-STRIPPING CASE

As discussed above, Boumediene was a habeas case. Though
habeas-stripping may conceptually be understood as a subset of
jurisdiction-stripping, the Court did not characterize the case as
a jurisdiction-stripping case. Rather, the Court addressed the
case as a habeas case. However, as this Section will demonstrate,
the principles the Court used to decide Boumediene effectively
provide answers to the jurisdiction-stripping debate.
This Section will show how Boumediene suggests a critical
limit on Congress's power to curtail federal court jurisdiction:
Congress cannot strip all jurisdiction over constitutional questions. The Section will then look at the two sub-powers that arguably give Congress the power to restrict federal court jurisdiction, the "ordain and establish" power to limit lower court
jurisdiction and the "exceptions and regulations" power to limit
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. The Section will show how
Boumediene may limit those two sub-powers, in addition to limiting Congress's ability to exercise those powers simultaneously. Then, in the following Section, I will demonstrate that these
limits are not limited to habeas cases; that they apply to all jurisdiction-stripping cases.
1. Preventing Stripping of All Federal Jurisdiction.

Perhaps the most significant development in Boumediene is
that it effectively answers the question of whether Congress can
strip jurisdiction from all federal courts. Boumediene effectively
says that Congress cannot do so, at least in cases involving constitutional questions. 84
I am not claiming that the Boumediene majority necessarily
saw itself as deciding this jurisdiction-stripping question. Rather,
my point is that the Boumediene Court employed three powerful
principles to decide whether the Suspension Clause extended to
Guantanamo, and that those principles can be applied to-and
largely resolve-the question of whether Congress can preclude
all federal court jurisdiction.
83. See id. at 2279.
84. A caveat to this principle where state courts may be available will be discussed
below. See infra notes 104-107 and accompanying text.
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a. Boumediene's Three Principles.
Recall that the government had requested a sovereigntybased test to determine the reach of the Suspension Clause. And
recall that the Court rejected that proposed test on the ground
that the test would violate separation of powers principles. Specifically, Boumediene's separation of powers argument contained
three principles.
First, the Court said that the political branches cannot set
their own boundaries. The Court could not abide the prospect
that "the political branches have the power to switch the Constitution on and off at will. " 85 In other words, someone other than
those branches must define the limits of those branches' power.
This can be thought of as the external limit principle. 86
Second, the Court said that the Courts must be the ones to
define the limits on the political branches' power. The problem
that the Court had with the prospect of the political branches
having the ability to "switch the Constitution on or off" was that
such power "would permit a striking anomaly in our tripartite
system of government, leading to a regime in which Congress
87
and the President, not this Court, say 'what the law is."' In other words, the Court said, the courts, not the political branches,
must define the Constitution's limits on the political branches'
power- must say "what the law is." This can be thought of as the
judicial enforcement principle.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for the jurisdictionstripping debate, the Court balked at the idea that the political
branches could manipulate the courts' ability to perform this
function: "The test for determining the scope of [the Suspension
Clause] must not be subject to manipulation by those whose

85. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259.
86. See Claus. supra note 13. at 64. 119-20 (noting separation of powers problem
with jurisdiction-stripping: "For three centuries, Western political thought has recognized
the evil in letting any government actor conclusively determine the reach of its own powers.").
87. See Boumediene. 128 S. Ct. at 2259 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
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power it is designed to constrain."K8 This can be thought of as the
89
anti-manipulation principle.
Although Boumediene deployed these three principles to
address a controversy over the territorial scope of the Suspension Clause, these three principles have important implications
for the jurisdiction-stripping debate.
The first two principles (the external limit principle and the
judicial enforcement principle) are powerful arguments for judicial review of the political branches' acts. In fact, these principles
were central to Chief Justice Marshall's famous justification for
judicial review in Marbury v. Madison-which Boumediene cites
prominently. 90 If there were no judicial review, Marshall reasoned, then the political branches would effectivelX have unli1
mited power-contrary to the Constitution's design. It is essentially an argument that (1) lack of oversight effectively means
lack of constraint (the external limit principle), and (2) that the
courts' role is to provide that oversight (the judicial enforcement
principle).
For example, suppose that the President were given the final decision on how much process the Due Process Clause required. He might decide that this clause required no process at
all, or no process beyond the "right" to respond during interrogation.92 He could thereby detain people indefinitely without any
hearing. Or suppose that Congress were given the final decision
on the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. Congress could
88. See id. This principle appears to have been suggested by a single Justice in 1950.
See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763.795 (1950) (Black, J .. dissenting) ("The Court is
fashioning wholly indefensible doctrine if it permits the executive branch. by deciding
where its prisoners will be tried and imprisoned, to deprive all federal courts of their
power to protect against a federal executive's illegal incarcerations."). But this principle
does not seem to have been adopted by the Court until Boumediene.
89. Note that this principle is slightly different than the one suggested by Professors
Sager, Tribe, and Claus, supra note 41. These commentators were concerned with Congress manipulating jurisdiction as a way to favor or disfavor particular rights. See, e.g.,
Sager. supra note 13, at 70 (contending that Congress cannot exercise its jurisdictionstripping power in a way that disfavors particular constitutional rights); Tribe, supra note
13 (decrying jurisdictional gerrymandering); see also Claus. supra note 13 at 67 (arguing
that. at the very least. Congress must not engage in issue-specific jurisdiction-stripping).
Boumediene's anti-manipulation principle seems broader. The concern is not that Congress may manipulate jurisdiction to favor or disfavor particular rights: it is that Congress
may try to manipulate jurisdiction to evade review of its (or the President's) conductirrespective of which right it might be infringing.
90. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259.
91. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
92. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,537 (2004) (highlighting the government's
argument that it provided process by permitting a prisoner to contest his status as an
"enemy combatant" during interrogation).
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decide that this clause only protected the slaves freed during the
Civil War, and thereby pass laws denying modern-day African
Americans or Catholics the right to own property. The correctness of these interpretations is not the issue. The issue is who
gets to interpret the Constitution. The point of Marshall's argument. echoed in Boumediene's first two separation of powers
principles, was that someone other than the political branchesspecifically, the judiciary-must be the arbiter of the Constitution's limits on those branches. 93
While these two principles have traditionally been deployed
in support of the power of judicial review, they also have implications for the jurisdiction-stripping debate. The argument is
that these principles not only permit judicial review (as Marbury
held), they require judicial review, at least in constitutional cases: If Congress could preclude judicial review, it would be able to
shed the very constraints that Marbury said were necessary to
keep the political branches in check. Thus, the argument goes,
courts must remain available to adjudicate constitutional claims
in order to "keep government generally within the bounds of
,44
I aw.
Readers might balk at these two principles, whether applied
to judicial review or jurisdiction-stripping. As most first year law
students learn in their study of Marbury, despite Chief Justice
Marshall's assertion, it is far from clear that absent judicial review the political branches would ignore the Constitution (the
external limit principle). Those elected to the political branches
take a similar oath to the one judges take to act within the
95
bounds of the Constitution. Whether they would keep themselves in check absent external oversight is arguably an open
question.% Also, even if one accepted the external limit principle,
it would seem to be an open question whether there are other
effective forms of oversight besides judicial review (the judicial
enforcement principle). For example, the electorate might vote a
93. Actually. Marbury did not necessarily establish that the courts must always get
the last word regarding the constitutionality of the political branches' actions. Read narrowly. that opinion might be understood as standing only for the proposition that the
courts get to evaluate constitutionality; not that they get the last word on the issue. See
Marburv. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. However. in later cases. the Court asserted that it gets
the last 'word on constitutionality. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
94. See Fallon & Meltzer. supra note 43. at 1778-79.
95. See. e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IL § L cl. 8. But see Paul A. Diller. When Congress
Passes an lntentionallv Unconstitutional Law: The Military Commissions Act Of 2006. 61
SMU L. REV. 281 (2008) (arguing that Congress passed- the MCA knowing that it was
unconstitutional and would be struck down by the Court).
96. See CHEMERINSKY. supra note 7. at 44.
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politician out of office for acting outside the bounds of the Constitution.97 Maybe courts are not necessary to keep the political
branches in check. And, of course, there is also the question of
9
who will provide a check on the courts. H
But my purpose here is not to debate whether these two
principles-when made by the Marbury Court or the Boumediene Court-are correct. My point is that the Boumediene
Court has adopted these two principles in a context that supports
their application to the jurisdiction-stripping debate.
Prior to Boumediene, these principles had been applied to
establish the power of judicial review. But they had never been
deployed by the Court to address the power of Congress to curtail judicial review. 99 Although Boumediene was not on its face a
jurisdiction-stripping case, the Court applied these principles in a
way that had the effect of requiring jurisdiction in a case in
which Congress had tried to restrict it. Congress had said that
only the D.C. Circuit could hear the case and simultaneously limited the ability of that court to do so. Based on the two Marbury principles, the Boumediene Court held that Congress could
not impose such a limit. Boumediene's use of these two principles to ensure jurisdiction strengthens the argument that these
principles preclude complete jurisdiction-stripping in constitutional cases.
But an additional argument against jurisdiction-stripping
flows from Boumediene's anti-manipulation principle (that the
political branches may not manipulate the scope of the Constitution's limits on their own power). This principle, which the Court
had not clearly articulated before,](KJ suggests that Congress cannot strip jurisdiction where doing so serves to shield Congress or
the President from judicial review in constitutional cases, giving

97. See id.
98. After Marbury. one possible answer to this question was that Congress could do
so. through its jurisdiction-stripping power. Boumediene appears largely to foreclose this
option without providing an alternative means of limiting the courts. Whether this is a
good idea is discussed more fully below in Part III.
99. As noted above. the Court did occasionally talk about the "'separation of powers"" problems that might arise if Congress were to preclude all jurisdiction over constitutional claims. See supra Section I.C. However. as also noted above. the Court never discussed what those "'separation of powers"' problems were. and never struck down a
jurisdiction-stripping or jurisdiction-restricting law based on these principles- until
Boumediene. See id.
100. While it is far from clear. one might read United States v. Klein as standing for
the proposition that Congress cannot manipulate federal court jurisdiction in a manner
designed to achieve specific outcomes in litigation. See SO U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871 ).
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the political branches the last word on the constitutionality of
their own actions. 101
To understand this point, consider again the hypotheticals
set forth above. In those hypotheticals, the President asserted
that the Due Process Clause did not preclude him from detaining
people without trial, and Congress asserted that the Equal Protection Clause did not preclude it from preventing African
Americans or Catholics from owning property. Exercising the
power of judicial review, the courts would almost certainly reach
different conclusions about the meaning of these two clauses.
But now suppose that Congress passed a law stripping jurisdiction from the courts to hear cases involving the Due Process
Clause or the Equal Protection Clause. Effectively, such a law
would manipulate the limits on the political branches. It would
permit those branches, and not the judiciary, to determine the
Constitution's limits on their actions- that is, to "say what the
law is." Boumediene's anti-manipulation principle seems to preclude such a tactic.
Thus, the three separation of powers principles deployed in
Boumediene appear to resolve, at least in part, the question of
complete jurisdiction-stripping. These three principles suggest
that Congress cannot preclude all jurisdiction in constitutional
102
cases.
101. Below. I will discuss the potential meanings of the anti-manipulation principle.
as well as how this principle can be reconciled with Ex Parte McCardle's famous pronouncement that Congress's intent is irrelevant in jurisdiction-stripping cases. 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 506. 515 (1869). See infra text accompanying notes 112-117. For now, I state the
principle generically.
102. One might wonder whether Boumediene's requirement for a federal court to
remain open applies only in constitutional cases, or whether a court must also be available to hear claims of statutory violations as well. See HART & WECHSLER. supra note 10.
at 352 (posing question of whether constitution requires review over "suits alleging that
official action has violated statutory. rather than constitutional. rights''): Richard H. Fallon. Jr.. Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III. 101 HARV. L.
REV. 915. 976--86 (1988) (advocating for the need of judicial review of legislative and
administrative actions). If courts are required to keep the federal government within the
bounds of its authority. this requirement would seem to apply to statutory, as well as constitutional authority. See Redish. supra note 15, at 148. 152. And this is a constitutional
principle-the type that would arguably trump Congress's Article III jurisdictionstripping powers. The Constitution requires the federal government to remain within its
bounds. When it acts within the power granted by a legitimate statute, it acts within its
bounds. When it exceeds such power. it acts outside of those bounds. Given the Boumediene Court's concern about unlimited government-and the need for courts to prevent
unlimited government-it might well be concerned with action that exceeds statutory. as
well as constitutional. bounds.
The separation of powers argument against jurisdiction-stripping in statutory cases is
arguably hampered by the argument that many statutory claims do not really involve the
unconstrained exercise of federal power. Specifically, when a statute provides an agency
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b. Potential Limits on Boumediene's Principles.
There are two-possibly three-important limits on my argument that Boumediene should be read as grecluding complete
3
jurisdiction-stripping in constitutional cases. First, Boumediene
does not necessarily preclude Congress from stripping all federal
jurisdiction in constitutional cases-at least in cases where state
courts (1) remain open, and (2) are capable of keeping the federal political branches in check. 104 Recall that Boumediene's
second principle (the judicial enforcement principle) requires a
court to keep the political branches of the federal government in
check. In Boumediene, which involved a habeas claim against the
federal government, only a federal court could provide such a
check. This is because, under Tarble's Case, a state court cannot
105
grant habeas petitions against the federal government. However, it remains possible that, in other types of cases, a state court
might be capable of serving as a check against the federal politiwith discretion to act within a certain range. it will be impossible to argue that the agency
is acting in an unconstrained fashion as long as it is acting within the range of its discretion. But this is really just a way of saying that. in such a case. there is no statutory violation. That is, in such a case the agency would be acting within its power under the statute.
as opposed to in violation of the statute. If the claim was that the agency exceeded the
discretion provided by the statute. such a statutory claim would again raise the specter of
unconstrained federal action.
103. I do not include in this discussion the possibility that my argument regarding the
implications of Boumediene's three principles might be limited to habeas claims. That
argument is discussed-and rejected-below in Section II.C.
Nor do I consider seriously the possibility that Boumediene was concerned only with
the geographic scope of constitutional limits (where the Constitution applies). as opposed
to the doctrinal scope of those limits (what the Constitution means). This possibility
would not give sufficient weight to all of the Boumediene Court's concerns. Although the
Court was clearly concerned with whether the Constitution applied in Guantanamo. the
reason for this concern was more substantive than geographic. The Court's point was that
the political branches should not be allowed to define their own limits; that if they could,
they would effectively be unrestrained. Yet the concern about lack of restraint is not just
a geographic concern. It is hard to imagine that the Court would be concerned with an
unrestrained exercise of power in Guantanamo, but not be concerned with such an unrestrained exercise of power in the U.S.
104. There has been a long-running debate about the role of state courts in the jurisdiction-stripping debate. Many proponents of jurisdiction-stripping have assumed that
state courts would remain available. or even argued that it is the availability of state
courts that permits Congress to strip jurisdiction from federal courts. See supra notes 15.
27. and 36.
A sub-part of this debate has included the question of whether state courts have the
institutional competence or insulation to keep state governments within the bounds of the
Constitution. See supra notes 39--43. However. Boumediene does not speak to that issue.
It only addresses the need for courts to keep the federal government within the bounds of
the Constitution.
105. See In re Tarble 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871). Tarb/e "has been much criticized." See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 356. But it also seems fairly well entrenched as precedent.
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cal branches. w<> In such cases, Boumediene's second principle
would be satisfied by the existence of a state court. That is, if
there are cases in which state courts could check the federal government, Congress could strip jurisdiction from all federal courts
in such cases so long as it left state courts in place. 107
A second limitation on my argument is that it does not necessarily require a court to hear every constitutional case; it merely requires that the judiciary, as opposed to Congress, determine
which constitutional cases do not need to be heard by a court. It
is highly unlikely that Boumediene would require courts to hear
all constitutional cases. Such a requirement would be monumentaL overturning hundreds of years of precedent in which the
Court has tolerated-in fact, sanctioned-the absence of judicial
review in constitutional cases in certain areas. For example, the
courts routinely demur to the political branches in cases involving "political questions" or other justiciability issues, in cases involvin~ immunity, and in cases involving conduct in a "theater of
war.,!( Yet, the Boumediene Court seemed unconcerned about
106. The Madisonian compromise almost certainly envisioned the possibility that
state courts might keep the federal government in check. The whole idea was that Congress might choose not create lower federal courts. instead leaving it to state courts (possibly with appellate review in the U.S. Supreme Court) to resolve constitutional claims.
See Redish. supra note 15. at 155. However. subsequent developments appear to make
this concept less likely. See, e.g., M'Clung v. Sillman. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821) (state
courts cannot compel performance by federal officers). But see Sager. supra note 13. at
82 (suggesting that Congress can waive this principle to permit state courts to check the
federal government. and might be required to do so in cases where it sought to preclude
federal jurisdiction). In any event. the question of whether state courts could effectively
check the federal government is beyond the scope of this Article. My point is only that if
state courts could do so. then Boumediene would appear to permit Congress to strip jurisdiction from federal courts to hear constitutional claims if it left state courts open.
107. It is also arguable that a non-Article III federal court might suffice. See HART &
WECHSLER. supra note 10. at 362-418 (discussing role of non-Article III federal courts).
However. given the Boumediene Court's insistence on disinterest and independence, see
128 S. Ct. at 2269. it would likely be quite skeptical of an organ of the political branches
serving as the only check on the political branches. See also Zadvydas v. Davis. 533 U.S.
678. 692 (2001) ("This Court has suggested ... that the Constitution may well preclude
granting an administrative body the unreviewable authority to make determinations implicating fundamental rights") (citing St. Cyr. 533 U.S. 289 (2001)). For an interesting
discussion of how Article I courts may implicate jurisdiction-stripping. see Pfander, supra
note 13.
108. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579. 635 (1952)
(Jackson. J.. concurring) (suggesting that Court would defer to President on issues occurring within a "theater of war"): CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7. at 49 et seq. (discussing
justiciability doctrines-including standing requirement. ripeness and mootness doctrines. prohibition on advisory opinions, and political question doctrine-as limits on
federal jurisdiction): id. at 180 et seq. (discussing sovereign immunity as a limit on federal
jurisdiction): see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 347-351 (suggesting that political question doctrine. sovereign immunity, and limits on remedies, may effectively
preclude review in certain types of cases): Fallon. supra note 13, at 329-39. 366--72 (dis-
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these doctrines precluding judicial review in constitutional cases,
and even seemed to endorse one of those doctrines (the "theater
109
of war" doctrine ).
Boumediene's apparent comfort with the preclusion of jurisdiction in certain constitutional cases seems to hinge on who is
doing the precluding. Doctrines such as justiciability, immunity,
and the theater-of-war doctrine were created, or at least endorsed, by the judiciary. 110 More importantly, the boundaries of
these doctrines are defined by the judiciary. Thus, what seems to
distinguish acceptable jurisdiction-limiting doctrines (such as justiciability, immunity, or the theater-of-war doctrine) from unacceptable jurisdiction-stripping is whether the doctrine- and
more importantly, the limit of the doctrine-is defined by the
judiciary. Put differently, Boumediene may stand less for the
proposition that a court must always be available to hear constitutional cases, and more for the proposition that the judiciarynot Congress-gets to say when a court need not be available to
hear such cases.
This distinction can be understood in terms of Boumediene's
three principles. The idea that there may be areas in which
courts need not decide constitutional cases represents an implicit
understanding that there are, in fact, exceptions to Boumediene's
first two principles (the external review principle and the judicial
enforcement principle). That is, in some cases, the Constitution
may well give the political branches the last word on constitutional issues. Yet-and this is the key-Boumediene's third (anti-manipulation) principle determines who gets to define those
exceptions: the judiciary, not the political branches. 111
The importance of Boumediene's anti-manipulation principle may suggest a third potential limit on my argument: Congress might be free to strip jurisdiction -even in constitutional
cussing well-accepted limits on judicial review). For an interesting discussion of whether
a Congressional attempt to suspend the writ would present a political question (and concluding it would not). see Amanda L. Tyler. Is Suspension a Political Question?. 59 STAN.
L. REV. 333 (2006); see also id. at 334 (noting that three sitting Justices have suggested
that such a statute would present a political question).
109. See Boumediene. at 2261--()2 (appearing to endorse "theater of war .. doctrine).
110. I include the caveat because one could see the immunity or the theater-of-war
doctrines as originating in the executive branch. as opposed to the Court. My point. however. is that irrespective of where the idea originated. the Court has endorsed the doctrine. and more importantly defines its boundaries.
111. Arguably. Boumediene's anti-manipulation principle would permit Congress (as
well as the judiciary) to define the limits of judicial review. so long as Congress did not do
so based upon an intent to manipulate. This possibility will be discussed in the text below.
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cases-so long as it does not do so as a form of manipulation. To
the extent that Boumediene's anti-manipulation principle is critical to my argument against jurisdiction-stripping (a condition
that certainly seems to be implicated by my discussion above,
distinguishing acceptable jurisdiction-limiting doctrines from unacceptable jurisdiction-stripping), this might suggest that Congress would be free to strip jurisdiction if it did so without violating the anti-manipulation principle. This fact, in turn, begs the
question of the meaning of "manipulation" in Boumediene's anti-manipulation principle. 112 There would seem to be two basic
options for defining "manipulation," one narrow and the other
one broad.
A narrow definition of manipulation might include an intent
element, with a restrictive concept of intent. Using this definition, Congress would only violate the anti-manipulation principle if it intended to use jurisdiction-stripping as a means to expand the constitutional prerogatives of the political branches. 113
Congressional action based on this type of intent would certainly
be troubling from a separation of powers point of view. It would
represent a conscious attempt by Congress to remove itself or
the President from constitutional supervision by the judiciary.
And this narrow definition of manipulation would almost certainly sweep in-and render unconstitutional-some of the more
egregious jurisdiction-stripping bills that have been proposed,
such as those to bar judicial review in cases involving Congressionally disfavored rights, such as cases dealing with abortion or
. 114
fl ag b urnmg.
However, this narrow definition of "manipulation" would
permit jurisdiction-stripping laws which had the effect of precluding judicial review in constitutional cases (and thus, of expanding the constitutional prerogatives of the political branches)
so long as that was not Congress's intent; that is, so long as Congress had some other intent, such as promoting administrative
efficiency or convenience. In other words, under this definition,
Congress would be free to engage in jurisdiction-stripping-even
112. The word "manipulation" is used by the Court in Boumediene. but with little
explanation or definition. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259.
113. It is possible. I suppose, to define intent as nothing more than a desire to restrict
jurisdiction. But that seems tautological. or at least meaningless. Presumably any statute
restricting jurisdiction is based on intent to restrict jurisdiction. So a better conception of
intent would seem to focus on intent to expand the constitutional prerogatives of the political branches.
114. See supra notes 8-9; see also note 41 (noting professors who believe that jurisdiction-stripping is constitutionally problematic when it favors certain rights over others).
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in constitutional cases-so long as it did so without (or so long as
no one could prove) an intent to expand the constitutional prerogatives of the political branches.
This narrow definition seems problematic for at least four
reasons. First, this definition would create a strange incentive for
Congress to pass numerous, broad jurisdiction-stripping statutes
that might just happen to shield Congress or the President from
judicial review in certain constitutional cases. Additionally, such
a narrow definition would seem to be at odds with the fact that
some of the Court's strongest warnings regarding the problems
with stripping jurisdiction over constitutional claims are contained in cases where there was no hint of Congressional intent
to expand the political branches' constitutional prerogatives;
these warnings occurred in cases involving nothing more than
115
preclusion of review of routine administrative law actions.
Moreover, the fact that this narrow definition is based on Congressional intent places it at odds with the Court's famous statement in Ex Parte McCardle that Congressional intent is irrelevant in jurisdiction-stripping cases. 11 " Finally, intent-based
standards are notoriously difficult to prove, especially when
117
dealing with legislative bodies.
115. See supra notes 48-52. and accompanying text.
116. See 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506. 515 (1869). To the extent that the Court were to adopt
a narrow. intent-based definition of manipulation. the inconsistency with McCardle might
be explained in one of two ways. First. one might argue that the anti-intent language of
McCardle was dicta. That is. the Court in McCardle may have been unconcerned with
Congress's intent because Congress did not in fact foreclose all routes to the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court. /d. at 515. Second. one might argue that it is far from clear that
this aspect of McCardle is still good law. McCardle may be seen as the product of a bygone era in which the Court generally declined, or at least hesitated. to attempt to discern legislative intent-an era that arguably lasted until the early 1970s. See Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217. 224 (1971) (discussing pitfalls of court trying to discern legislative intent); United States v. O'Brien. 391 U.S. 367. 383 (1968) (explaining the risks of
trying to perceive legislative intent); Fletcher v. Peck. 6 Cranch 87. 136 (1810) (elaborating on the difficulties of attempting to discover the legislative intent behind a statute).
However. in later years. the Court has been far less concerned with such issues and regularly assesses legislative intent. See, e.g., Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp .. 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (assessing legislative intent); see also Washington v. Davis. 426
U.S. 229 (1976) (requiring proof of legislative intent in Equal Protection claims). In this
respect. one might read McCardle's hesitance to address legislative intent as having been
overruled prior to Boumediene. But to the extent that (1) McCardle can be read as reflecting non-concern with legislative intent. and (2) this non-concern survived the Court's
post-1970s focus on intent. Boumediene's third. anti-manipulation principle-and the
limitation that principle imposes on that case's jurisdiction-stripping prohibition-must
be understood as a repudiation of this aspect of McCardle.
117. See Paul Brest. Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive. 1971 S. CT. REV. 95; Martin J. Katz. The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation in Disparate Treatment Law. 94 GEO.
L.J. 489 (2006).
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A better definition of "manipulation" for purposes of Boumediene's anti-manipulation principle, is a broader one based on
effect, rather than intent: Congress should be seen as manipulating jurisdiction in violation of this principle any time it passes jurisdiction-stripping legislation which has the effect of expanding
the political branches' constitutional prerogatives-irrespective
of whether Congress intended this effect. This definition avoids
the four problems with the narrower definition. It avoids incentives to pass sweeping, non-specific jurisdiction-limiting legislation: is consistent with the Court's dicta in cases that do not seem
to involve any intent to expand political branch prerogatives;
does not run afoul of McCardle; and does not involve a problematic search for legislative intent.
Thus, Boumediene's anti-manipulation principle is best understood as being implicated any time that Congress passes a law
that has the effect of precluding judicial review in a constitutional case, thereby expanding the constitutional prerogatives of the
political branches-irrespective of whether this was Congress's
intent. For this reason, I do not believe that my argument is limited to cases in which someone can prove Congressional intent
to expand its power or the President's power. But if the Court
were to adopt the narrower definition of manipulation, my argument may well be limited to such cases.
In summary, we can derive from Boumediene's three principles the following rule regarding complete jurisdictionstripping: Congress cannot strip all jurisdiction over constitutional claims. In such cases, Congress must leave in place some
court capable of providing a meaningful check on the political
branches. And while the judiciary may abstain from hearing such
cases through doctrines such as justiciability, immunity, and the
theater-of-war doctrine, the judiciary-not Congress-must determine the boundaries of any doctrine that would preclude jurisdiction in constitutional cases.
2. Lower Federal Courts and Fact-finding.
We have seen how the three separation of powers principles
deployed hy Boumediene to address the territorial scope of the
Suspension Clause suggest a significant limit on Congress's power to preclude all federal jurisdiction. In this Section, I will show
how a fourth principle articulated in Boumediene suggests a significant limit on Congress's power to preclude lower court juris-
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diction. Specifically, this principle suggests that, at least in some
cases, a lower court must be left open for fact-finding.
In the context of discussing the requirements of an adequate
substitute for habeas, Boumediene compared the procedures
available under the DTA with those available under the basic
habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. Section 2241. In this comparison,
Boumediene found particularly important the fact that Section
2241 "accommodates the necessity for fact-finding that will arise
in some cases by allowing the appellate judge or Justice to transfer the case to a district court of competent jurisdiction, whose
institutional capacity for fact-finding is superior to his or her
,ItS
own.
In other words, the Court said, (1) in some cases, factfinding will be necessary, and (2) where fact-finding is necessary,
some entity with the institutional capacity for fact-finding must
remain open. This principle leaves open the question of which
119
cases require fact-finding, a question I will address below. But
in such cases, Boumediene limits lower court jurisdictionstripping in one of two important ways.
First, a strong reading of Boumediene's factfinder requirement might suggest that a lower federal court must be left open
for fact-finding in such cases. Boumediene did specifically refer
120
to "a district court. " Moreover, as our federal courts are currently structured, federal district courts are designed to serve as
the trial courts; the courts that are institutionally designed to
find facts. This role would seem to make federal district courts
the most obvious entities to satisfy Boumediene's factfinder requirement. Thus, one could argue, Boumediene stands for the
proposition that, at least in certain types of cases, Congress must
leave open a particular type of court-a federal district courtto find facts.
However, this is probably an over-reading of Boumediene.
A second, weaker, reading of Boumediene seems more plausible:
Boumediene's factfinder requirement precludes Congress from
closing down all lower federal courts unless a competent factfinder remains available. But the Court might well accept someone other than a lower federal court as a competent factfinder.
For example, in at least some types of cases, a state court may be

llR
119.
120.

See Boumediene v. Bush 128 S. Ct. 2229.2266 (2008) (emphasis added).
See infra Section II.C.2.
See Boumediene. 128 S. Ct. at 2266.
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available as a factfinder. Alternatively, in some cases, Boumediene's requirement of a competent factfinder might be satisfied
by a federal agency or a non- Article III court. 122
This second, weaker, reading would seem to be supported
by Boumediene's functionalist approach to the question of competence. In Boumediene, the Court did not focus specifically on
which entities would be competent to review cases brought by
prisoners at Guantanamo. Instead, it focused on the attributes
which would qualify an entity to hear such cases: The entity must
be "disinterested in the outcome and committed to procedures
designed to ensure its own independence." 123 In other words, the
factfinder must be (1) disinterested, and (2) independent. This
set of qualifications would suggest that the factfinder does not
necessarily need to be a lower federal court. It might be a state
court or even a federal agency, so long as that state court or federal agency were sufficiently disinterested and independent. 124
In summary, Boumediene suggests an important limitation
on Congress's widely assumed ability to strip jurisdiction from
the lower federal courts: At least in certain types of cases, some
entity must be available to perform fact-finding. And while it is
not clear that this entity must be a lower federal court, it does
need to be disinterested and independent.

121. In Boumediene, there was no possibility that a state court could play any role.
Ever since Tarb/e 's Case. it has been clear that a state court cannot hear a habeas case
against the federal government; that is, a state court cannot order the federal government
to release a prisoner. See 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871). However. as I will argue below in
Section II.C.2. Boumediene's factfinder requirement is not limited to habeas cases. And
the possibility of state courts serving as the requisite factfinders in constitutional cases
may be viable in cases that do not involve habeas petitions against the federal government. See supra text accompanying notes 103-106.
122. See infra note 107. It also remains possible that the Supreme Court could serve
as a factfinder. However. if the lower federal courts were closed, in the vast majority of
cases the Supreme Court's jurisdiction would be limited to appellate jurisdiction, which
might serve to limit its legal ability to engage in fact-finding. See U.S. CONST. art. III (dividing Supreme Court jurisdiction between original and appellate jurisdiction).
123. Boumediene. 128 S. Ct., at 2269 (discussing attributes of criminal courts that
seemed to be lacking in military commissions); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,
533 (2004) (holding that the due process clause requires. "that a citizen-detainee seeking
to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual
basis for his classification. and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.").
124. This principle has implications for the distinction between entities that are primarily political and those that are more insulated from the political process. Specifically.
an agency that is more independent from the President might be considered competent
to act as a factfinder, while one that is less independent might not. See Bowshar v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714. 726 (1986) (discussing, and applauding, the fact that the independent counsel is independent of the executive branch. despite being part of that branch).
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3. The Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction
The Court in Boumediene does not say anything directly
about Congress's ability to strip the Court's appellate jurisdiction pursuant to the Exceptions Clause. However, Boumediene's
actions in this regard arguably speak louder than words, and may
be understood as supporting the idea that Congress cannot p~ec
120
lude all routes to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.
There is little ambiguity about Boumediene's actions. In this
case, Congress unequivocally sought to bar the Court's appellate
jurisdiction. The MCA provides, "No court, justice, or judge
shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a
126
writ of habeas corpus" in cases such as Boumediene. The Act
also provides that, in non-habeas actions, the only federal court
with jurisdiction is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. 127 In other words, Congress made clear that the U.S.
Supreme Court had no business hearing habeas cases or any
other cases regarding Guantanamo detainees designated as
enemy combatants. Yet the Supreme Court did not hesitate to
take the case. Effectively, it acted as if Congress could not preclude the Court from taking the case.
Of course, the Court could have heard the Boumediene case
solely for the purpose of deciding it did not have jurisdiction.
But the Court's review was not so limited. Rather, the Court
took the case and decided it on the merits-despite being highly
aware of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the MCA. This
action suggests that the Court effectively rejected those provisions insofar as they might have precluded its own appellate review.
The Court did not discuss this issue. So we do not know the
basis for its action. However, the Court's action is consistent
with strong dicta in cases going back nearly 140 years suggesting
that, in exercising its Exceptions Clause power, Congress must
leave open some route to Supreme Court review, at least certain
cases. For example, in Ex Parte McCardle, the Court upheld an
act by Congress that stripped the Court of appellate jurisdiction,
but included a paragraph at the end of the opinion pointing out
that another statutory route to the Court's appellate jurisdiction
125. Section II.C.3. below. will discuss the types of cases to which this rule applies.
126. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(l) (2006) (emphasis added).
127. See id. § 2241(e)(2). incorporating Detainee Treatment Act §§ 1005(e)(2) and
(3). 10 U.S.C. § 801 (granting exclusive jurisdiction for judicial review to D.C. Circuit in
non-habeas cases).
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128

remained available. The implication was that the outcome
might have been different had some alternative route not been
left open. And in Felker v. Turpin, the Court reiterated this suggestion in stronger terms. There, in upholding the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the Court emphasized
that ( 1) the statute did not preclude all access to the Supreme
Court, and (2) the availability of such access obviated constitutional issues that might have otherwise plagued the statute. 129
Justice Souter, along with two other Justices, expressly noted
that "if it should later turn out that [other] statutory avenues ...
were closed, the question whether the statute exceeded Congress's Exceptions Clause power would be open." 130
In those cases, the Court essentially warned Congress that
precluding all access to the Supreme Court might well be unconstitutional. Thus, in Boumediene, where the Court accepted
jurisdiction and decided the case on the merits in the face of a
clear desire by Congress to preclude such review, it seems reasonable to suppose that the Court's action may have been based
on the rationale expressed in its earlier dicta: That Congress
cannot exercise its Exceptions Clause power in a way that would
close all avenues to the Court. Accordingly, Boumediene can
plausibly be read as requiring that Congress leave open some
route to the Court's appellate jurisdiction.
C. THE UNIVERSALITY OF BOUMEDIENE: IT IS NOT JUST A
HABEAS CASE

The most obvious objection to the argument I have made is
that, whatever principles Boumediene may have articulated or
relied upon, such principles might be limited to habeas cases. After all, Boumediene was a habeas case; a case challenging bodily
detention. m And the ostensible basis for the Court's decision in
Boumediene was the Suspension Clause-which applies only to
habeas cases. 132
128. See Ex Parte McCardle. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506. 515 (1869).
129. See Felker v. Turpin. 518 U.S. 651. 661 (1996).
130. See id. at 667 (Souter. J .. concurring).
131. See Boumediene. 128 S. Ct. 2240; see also HART & WECHSLER. supra note 10. at
352
The historic office [of habeas] is to test the lawfulness of bodily detentions ....
In modern practice. habeas corpus is frequently employed as a mode of reviewing criminal convictions obtained in courts. Historically. however. an even more
fundamental role was to authorize judicial oversight of detentions imposed extra-judicially by executive officials.
132. See Boumediene. 128 S. Ct. at 2240; see also U.S. CONST. art. I.§ 9. cl. 2 (provid-
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It this were true, if Boumediene's answers to the jurisdiction-stripping debate were limited to habeas cases, these answers
would still be significant. If that were the case, we would at least
have important guidance about the limits of Congress's jurisdiction-stripping powers in habeas cases. But there is reason to believe that at least some, and perhaps all, of Boumediene's answers extend well beyond habeas cases. The principles
underlying those answers appear to apply to all constitutional
claims.
1. Stripping All Federal Jurisdiction: Boumediene

Applies to All Constitutional Claims.
My claim regarding the significance of Boumediene is
strongest with respect to its implications for the general jurisdiction-stripping question: the idea that, in exercising its jurisdiction-stripping powers, Congress must leave in place some federal
court to hear constitutional claims. 133 This principle almost certainly extends beyond habeas cases. Rather, it applies to all constitutional claims, irrespective of whether they involve detention.
This scope is apparent from three aspects of the Court's opinion.
First, the Boumediene Court made clear that it saw habeas
as a means, not an end. The protection of constitutional rights
was the end. The Court stated, "[T]he writ of habeas corpus is an
indis&ensable mechanism for monitoring the separat!on of powers." · Elsewhere, the Court spoke of the compelling need to
adhere to "freedom's first principles," and highlighted two such
principles: One was "freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint"- that is, habeas. The other was "the personal liberty
that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers." 135 In
other words, the majority in Boumediene understood the case
not just as a habeas case, but also more broadly as a separation
of powers case.
ing the text of the Suspension Clause): INS v. St. Cyr. 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (holding that
Suspension Clause limits Congress's power to preclude habeas review).
133. As noted above. there is some question as to whether, in some non-habeas cases. a state court might suffice. See supra text accompanying notes 105-107. However. for
purposes of this Section. I will refer to Boumediene's principle as requiring a federal
court in constitutional cases.
134. See Boumediene. 128 S. Ct. at 2259. Professor Tyler makes a similar argument
regarding habeas as a means to another end: that habeas serves to ensure due process.
See Tyler. supra note 108. at 337.
135. See Boumediene. 128 S. Ct. at 2277. The Court also mentioned the importance
of separation of powers principle at id. at 2263 (noting that the "gravity of the separationof-powers issues raised by these cases" was '"exceptional").
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In fact, the Court was explicit as to the way it saw the relationship between habeas and the separation of powers principles
it articulated. Immediately after articulating its three separation
of powers principles, the Court noted, "These concerns have
particular bearing on the Suspension Clause question .... " 136 In
other words, the Court expressly saw the need for habeas as an
example- a subset- of its broader concerns about separation of
powers.
Second, the three separation of powers principles that
served as the foundation for the Boumediene Court's opinion
apply not just to habeas cases; they apply to all constitutional
claims. The core principle that animated Boumediene was the
Court's assertion that judicial review is required to keep the political branches within the bounds of the Constitution. The
Court's fear was that, by strategically locating operations in
places such as Guantanamo that would arguably permit evasion
of judicial review, the political branches could effectively transgress the Constitution as they pleased- that they could "switch
the Constitution on or off at will. " 137 Yet this fear cannot be limited to habeas cases, or cases in which someone is in custody.
The concern that, absent judicial review, the political branches
could transgress the Constitution at will applies to any of the
myriad ways in which the political branches can transgress the
constitution even when no one is in custody.' 38
For example, suppose that the government fined people
who refused to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, or barred them
from voting. And suppose that the government could preclude
judicial review of such fines or disenfranchisement. There would
be no custody, and thus no habeas claims. Yet this would be exactly the type of unlimited power-the same ability to transgress
the Constitution with impunity-that the Boumediene Court
feared. The principle applies not just to habeas cases; it applies
to all constitutional claims. ~
13

136. See id. at 2259.
137. See id.
138. Of course. in cases where someone is in custody. the availability of habeas may
serve to address this concern. See INS v. St. Cyr. 533 U.S. 289. 299 (2001) (distinguishing
between judicial review and habeas and noting that leaving habeas intact avoided constitutional problem). My point is that even in cases where habeas is not required. Boumediene·s separation of powers principle require judicial review.
139. See Daniel J. Meltzer. Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO.
L.J. 2537. 2573 (1998) (explaining that the checking-the-political-branches argument requires judicial review in non-habeas. as well as habeas cases).
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Third, the Boumediene Court's selection of authority suggests that its principle applies in non-habeas cases. The claim
that judicial review is necessary to keep the political branches
within the bounds of the Constitution comes straight out of
Marbury v. Madison. 140 And Boumediene clearly relied on that
case, citing it directly for the proposition that the Court (as opposed to the political branches) must have the ability "to say
what the law is." 141 Yet Marbury was not a habeas case. Marbury
established the courts' right to find that any type of action by the
political branches violates the Constitution. That is, Marbury
applied to all constitutional claims. And Boumediene's conscious
embrace of Marbury suggests that its reasoning applies to all
constitutional claims.
These three arguments strongly suggest that Boumediene's
answer to the general jurisdiction-stripping question- that Congress cannot preclude all federal jurisdiction -extends beyond
habeas cases. Rather, this principle extends to all constitutional
142
claims.
2. The Need for a Factfinder: Boumediene Applies to all
Constitutional Claims.
Boumediene's suggestion that Congress cannot preclude all
lower federal court jurisdiction unless a disinterested and independent factfinder remains available appears similar in scope:
This principle appears to apply to all constitutional claims, or at
least those constitutional claims that are fact-specific.
One can, of course, argue that this principle is limited to habeas cases. After all, Boumediene was a habeas case. And Boumediene's discussion of the need for fact-findin9 occurred in the
43
context of a discussion about habeas substitutes.
However, the better view is that the principle applies to all
constitutional claims. As discussed in the prior Section, Boumediene was concerned about protecting constitutional rights more
140. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
141. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259 (citing Marbury. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177).
142. Professor Claus offers another argument against limiting any jurisdictionstripping argument to habeas cases: He argues that the primary textual limit on jurisdiction-stripping comes from Article III's vesting clause; that the Suspension Clause presupposes the existence of jurisdiction. rather than itself requiring such jurisdiction. See
Claus. supra note 13, at 109-12. However, Boumediene appears to be based on separation of powers principles. as opposed to the textualist principle set forth by Professor
Claus.
143. See Boumediene. 128 S. Ct. at 2266.
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generally- not just in habeas cases or cases involving detention.1+~ And in many constitutional cases, factfinding is essential.
Without adequate fact-finding, there can be no adequate constitutional review.
Consider a simple example of the fact-dependency of constitutional litigation. Suppose that Congress passed a statute precluding any judicial review of facts in free speech cases. And suppose that a speaker gave an anti-government speech. And
finally, suppose that the government took the position that the
speech was "incitement" (which is largely unprotected by the
first amendment), and therefore sought to impose a large fine on
the speaker. If the speaker defended on first amendment
grounds, the case would largely turn on a factual determination:
whether the speech was in fact "incitement"; that is, whether it
was intended and likely to cause the audience imminently to vi145
olate the law. Yet, as a result of the statute precluding review
of facts, the court could not engage in meaningful review. It
would be bound to accept the government's factual contention
that the speech was "incitement." Effective!~, the government
46
could suppress speech without judicial review.
As discussed above, Boumediene seemed concerned with
protecting constitutional rights, irrespective of whether the fail147
ure to do so results in detention. It therefore seems likely that
the Boumediene Court would require the availability of a factfinder not just in habeas or detention cases, but in all constitutional cases.
3. The Need for Supreme Court Appellate Review: The
Unclear Scope of Boumediene
The scope of Boumediene's implicit holding that Congress
cannot foreclose all routes to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is less clear. This is in large part because we do not really know the Court's justification for this holding.
The separation of powers principles that underlie Boumediene's suggested limits on complete jurisdiction-stripping do not
144. See supra Section II.C.l.
145. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio. 395 U.S. 444. 447 (1969) (holding ''incitement"
not protected and defining that term).
. .
.
146. This idea. that factfinding may control the outcome of constitutiOnal claims, was
recognized by the Court in Crowell v. Benson. 285 U.S. 22 (1932) ("(W)herever fundamental rights depend. as not infrequently they do depend. upon facts .... finality as to
facts becomes in effect finality in law.").
147. See supra Section II.C.l.
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apply to the Court's implicit holding that Congress cannot foreclose all avenues for its appellate review. These separation of
powers principles require some judicial review. But they do not
necessarily require judicial review by the Supreme Court exercising its appellate jurisdiction. Any federal (or possibly state)
court should do. Accordingly, the idea that Congress is required
to leave open some route to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction must be based on some other argument.
Actually, we do not really know what argument might underlie Boumediene's willingness to ignore Congress's limit on its
appellate jurisdiction. As noted above, Boumediene did not discuss its reasoning for accepting the appeal and deciding the case
on the merits despite the MCA's removal of its appellate jurisdiction.14l< And to the extent that this action was based on dicta
from earlier cases, those cases never discussed their reasoning
either. 149 Without an understanding of the reasoning for the principle, it is difficult to know its scope.
That is not to say that we have no clues as to the possible
scope of Boumediene's implicit threat on stripping the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction. There are three clues, two of
which suggest a limited scope (that Boumediene's implicit holding regarding Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction is limited to
habeas cases), and one of which suggests a broader scope.
First, a reference within the Boumediene opinion suggests a
limited scope. To understand this reference, it is important to
keep in mind that the argument in favor Congress's ability to
strip the Supreme Court of its appellate jurisdiction is based on
the fact that the Exceptions Clause of Article III gives Congress
the power to "regulate" that jurisdiction. 150 The Boumediene
Court referred to this language only once. And that reference
was clearly focused on the writ. Specifically, the Court noted that
the Suspension Clause serves as "an 'exception' to the 'power
given to Congress to regulate courts. "' 151 This suggests that the
Court understood the limit on Congress's power to strip its appellate jurisdiction as coming from the Suspension clause-the
Constitutional enshrinement of the writ. 152
148. See supra Section II.B.3.
149. See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin. 51R U.S. 651 (1996): Ex Parte McCardle. 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 506.513-14 (1R69).
150. See U.S. CONST. art. III.§ 2.
151. Boumediene. 12R S. Ct. 2229. 2246 (2008).
152. But see Claus. supra note 13. at 109-12 (arguing that the writ is enshrined in Article III. not the Suspension Clause).
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Second, Boumediene's lineage in this area lies squarely
within the realm of habeas. As noted above, Boumediene effectively made good on a warning that the Court had provided several times before: That, in exercising its Exceptions Clause power, Congress must leave open some appellate access to the
Supre~e Court. Nota~~f' each of those earlier warnings occurred m a habeas case. However, a third argument points the other way: to the
need to preserve Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in cases
beyond habeas. This argument has to do with the Court's view of
its own necessity. As will be discussed in the following Part,
Boumediene represents a fairly bold stroke by the Court. 154 In
that sense, the Supreme Court is clearly taking a leadership role
in proclaiming the importance of federal judicial review in the
constitutional structure. Given its leadership role, one might
wonder if the Supreme Court would really ever allow itself to be
sidelined, with final say over constitutional questions in nonhabeas cases given to lower federal courts. 155
But at least for now, Boumediene seems to have: (1) unequivocally answered the question of whether Congress can close
all routes to the Supreme Court in habeas cases (it cannot), but
(2) left open the question of whether it must remain available as
a forum in non-habeas cases.
III. BOUMEDIENE AS AN ACT OF IMPERIALISM
If all Boumediene had done was to provide answers-even
partial answers-to the jurisdiction-stripping debate, that would
be quite significant. But perhaps what is most significant about
Boumediene was the Court's willingness to articulate the principles it did, when historically it had been extremely hesitant to
do so.
As discussed above, the Court has tended to use a strong
avoidance doctrine to avoid squarely facing the question of
whether Congress can strip the courts of jurisdiction: Whenever
possible (and sometimes even when it seemed impossible), the
See Felker, 518 U.S. 651; McCardle, 74 U.S. 506.
See infra Part III.
See, e.g., Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 13, at 1008 (arguing that Supreme
Court review is necessary to give meaning to the terms "supreme" and "inferior" in Article III): Claus, supra note 13, at 114 (articulating the same textual argument); Pfander,
supra note 31 (making the same Article III argument). Boumediene, however, did not
appear to consider this textual argument.
153.
154.
155.
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Court has interpreted statutes to find that they did not preclude
all jurisdiction-thus avoiding the question of whether Congress
156
could do so.
Notably, the Court could have taken a similar approach in
Boumediene-at least in a number of respects. The statutes in
question (the DCA and MCA) actually gave jurisdiction to one
federal court (the D.C. Circuit), and also created fact-finding
bodies (the military commissions). 157 Notably, in a dissent by Justice Roberts, four of the Justices in Boumediene stated that these
statutes could be read to provide these two entities with the
power to perform all of functions that the majority deemed necessary for them to serve as an adequate substitute for habeas.""
While the correctness of the dissent's statutory reading may
be open for debate, that is not the point. The point is that this
statutory reading was at least possible. It was plausible enough
to have been adopted by four Justices. And it hardly seems less
plausible than readings the Court has given to jurisdiction159
stripping statutes in many of its avoidance cases. Such a reading would have allowed the Court to avoid the constitutional
question regarding the territorial scope of the Suspension
Clause. And while such a reading might have yielded a result
that differed formally from the one reached in Boumediene (it
would not have provided the non-citizen detainees with the right
to seek habeas), it would have yielded a similar-arguably indistinguishable-practical result (a statutory process possessing all
of the attributes of habeas that the Court saw as essential).
Yet the Court did not choose this path of avoidance. Instead, the Boumediene Court read the statutes as precluding the
type of process that would have provided an adequate habeas
substitute, thereby forcing the constitutional question regarding
the scope of the Suspension Clause.'(,() And the Court did not
stop there. It went on to answer that constitutional question in
the most forceful of ways, not merely striking down the DTA
and MT A, but doing so based on broad and powerful separation
of powers principles-principles suggesting the need for judicial

156.
part. has
157.
158.
159.
160.

See supra Section I. C.: see also Sager. supra note 13. at 20 ("'[T]he Court. for its
generally tried to avoid or soften confrontations with the national legislature.").
See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006).
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2283-85 (Roberts. J .. dissenting).
See supra Section I. C.
See Boumediene. 128 S. Ct. at 2270-75.
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review to police other branches' compliance with the Constitution.1"1 In these ways, Boumediene was surely a bold decision.
This boldness raises two key questions. First, it raises a descriptive question: Why did the Court choose this case for such a
bold act, after resisting the temptation to act in this way in so
many earlier cases? Second, it raises a normative question: Is this
boldness a good thing? Was Boumediene justifiably bold, or was
it imperious? Should we be happy with Boumediene or frightened by it? While it is beyond the scope of this Article to attempt to provide definitive answers to either of these questions,
I will offer a few thoughts on each.
With respect to the descriptive question of why the Court
has acted in this way now, I will offer the observation that perhaps it was provoked. On a micro level, the Court may have
been provoked by the sheer amount of time that the detainees
had been held by the government (some, nearly six years) with
what the Court perceived as no meaningful opportunity to challenge their detentions. 162 But, as noted above, the court could
have provided the detainees with process in a less bold manner.
More likely, the Court may have been provoked on a macro
level. Since the beginning of the war on terror, President Bush
had claimed extraordinary-some might say imperiouspowers.104 In response, one might have expected, perhaps hoped,
1~>3

161. See supra Section II.B.
162. See Bownediene. 128 U.S. at 2275 (noting that. "In some of these cases six years
have elapsed without the judicial oversight that habeas corpus or an adequate substitute
demands."): see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507.520-21 (2004)
It is a clearly established principle of the law of war that detention may last no
longer than active hostilities .... If the practical circumstances of a given conflict
are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the
law of war [permitting detentions for the duration of the conflict]. that understanding may unravel. But that is not the situation we face as of this date. Active
combat operations against Taliban fighters apparently are ongoing in Afghanistan.
Rasul v. Bush. 542 U.S. 466. 485 (2004) (noting "the Executive's potentially indefinite
detention of individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing").
163. See supra text following note 159; see also Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2293 (Roberts. 1.. dissenting) (suggesting that Court's ruling might delay rather than expedite detainees' release).
164. See, e.g., CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2007); Linda Greenhouse. Fundamental Questions: The Imperial Presidency and the Constraints of the Law.
N.Y. TIMES. Apr. 18. 2004. at 07; see also JORDAN J. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW: THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S UNLAWFUL RESPONSES IN THE "WAR" ON TERROR (2007)
(claiming that President Bush acted criminally in war on terror).
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that the Court would step up and try to stop such exercises of an
165
imperial presidency.
In this respect, one might even comment on the Court's restraint. The Court certainly had the opportunity to push back
against an imperious President in earlier cases, such as Hamdi
and Hamdan. But notably, in its earlier cases in the war on terror, the Court did not push back directly against the President.
Instead, the Court looked to Congress to control any excesses of
an imperial presidency. 106 For example, in Hamdi, the Court invited Congress to create a set of procedures for military tribunals
167
to determine "enemy combatant" status. And in Hamdan, the
Court invited the President to ask Congress to pass a law authorizing him to use military commissions to try individuals accused
of certain types of wrongdoing. 168
The idea seemed like a sound one. If the Court could stand
back and let Congress act as a check on an imperial President,
the problem might be solved-the imbalance redressed-with no
169
need for the Court to seem imperious. The problem is that, in
the climate of the war on terror, Congress seemed only too hap170
py to comply with any request from the President.
In fact, the Court might have come to view Congress not as
a check on imperious presidential power, but as an enabler of
such power. After the Court ruled against the President and held

165. Linda Greenhouse expressed this hope in two articles. one in 2002 and the other
in 2004-before the Supreme Court had acted on any of the "war on terror" cases. See
Greenhouse, supra note 164. at D7: Linda Greenhouse, War of Secrets: Judicial Restraint:
The Imperial Presidency vs. the Imperial Judiciary. N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8. 2002 at D3.
166. See William N. Eskridge. Jr. & Philip P. Frickey. Quasi-Constitlllional Law:
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking. 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992) (arguing that the Court uses statutory construction rules to force Congress to consider constitutional issues): Friedman, supra note 54. at 670 (describing how Congress may promote dialogue over constitutional issues by prodding Congress to act):.
167. See Hamdi, at 538.
168. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749. 2799 (Breyer, J .. concurring) ("Congress has denied the President the legislative authority to create military commissions of
the kind at issue here. Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek
the authority he believes necessary.").
169. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990) (arguing that the Court
should take on the role of promoting discourse between the political branches in foreign/military affairs matters). But see Owen Fiss. The War Against Terrorism and the
Rule of Law, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 235. 239 (2006) (criticizing Court for refusing
to engage core substantive issues in cases regarding the war on terror).
170. It is arguable that Congress has been too eager to cede power to the President
even in matters that do not involve war. See Clinton v. New York. 524 U.S. 417 (1998)
(holding that Congress impermissibly tried to give power to the President to veto specific
items in spending bill).
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that the general habeas statute permitted review of aliens at
171
Guantanamo, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act
(DTA), precluding such review. 172 And after the Court ruled
against the President and held that the DTA was not retroactive
(thereby permitting review of claims that were already pending)
and that Congress had not authorized trials by military commissions,m Congress passed the Military Commissions Act, precluding pending claims and authorizing trial by military commissions.174 So it may well have appeared to the Boumediene Court
that Congress simply was not up to the task of counter-balancing
an imperious executive. Thus, the Court may have decided to
take that role upon itself.
As to the normative question of whether this is a good
thing, this is even harder to say. But here, too, I will offer a few
observations, both prudential and structural.
As a prudential matter, the question is whether the Court
should have avoided or engaged the constitutional question. The
avoidance doctrine makes some sense. It allows the Court to
avoid difficult questions, where the Court risks making decisions
. it may later regret. 175 It might make sense for the Court to try, at
least in the first instance, to prod Congress into doing the right
thing. 170 Avoidance also allows the Court to take a stance of humility, avoiding grand proclamations of its own power or of
Congress's lack of power. The doctrine avoids the possibility of a
constitutional stand-off, in which a political branch might refuse
to follow an order of the Court (though this possibility seems
less likely in modern times). 177 And the doctrine arguably pro171. See Rasul v. Bush. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
172. See 28 U.S.C. § 224l(e) (2006).
173. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
174. See 28 U.S.C. § 224l(e). Although the dissent in Boumediene attempts to characterize the MCA as a careful balancing act by Congress. the Act incorporates most of
the features of the President's program that were most problematic. including (I) the
Commissions can still hear and consider hearsay evidence. (2) the Commissions can still
hear and consider evidence extracted through "extended interrogation techniques:· so
long as that evidence was obtained prior to the DT A, and (3) suspects may still be barred
from learning about. and therefore effectively refuting, evidence against them that has
been classified as secret. See id. The MCA also sought to quash all outstanding habeas
petitions. See id. In other words, the MCA purported to give to the President most, if not
all. of the powers he asserted prior the passage of that statute.
175. See, e.g., Gordon G. Young. Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and
rhe Preservation of Judicial Review. 78 TEx. L. REV. 1549 (2000).
176. See Eskridge & Frickey. supra note 166 (discussing Court's use of statutory construction rules to force Congress to consider constitutional issues); Friedman, supra note
54. at 668-69 (discussing Court's role in facilitating dialogue over constitutional issues).
177. Compare CHEMERINSKY. supra 7, at 46 (noting that at time of Marbury. the
President would almost certainly have disregarded an order of the Court with which he
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motes a certain healthy uncertainty. Perhaps it is a good thing
for the judiciary to have to worry about jurisdiction-stripping,
and for Congress to have to worry about whether it has this
17X
power.
Of course, there may also be a time for certainty and backbone, rather than uncertainty and forbearance. As discussed
above, the Court may have been responding to a sense that the
President was out of control and that Congress was not likely to
stand up to him. Perhaps this was a time for action, rather than
avoidance.
As a structural matter, the general idea of one branch rising
to challenge another branch that seems to be accumulating too
much power makes some sense. And it is hardly a new idea. It is
part of the Framers' design. Notably, more than 200 years ago,
soon-to-be-Chief Justice John Marshall expressed the idea in
connection with the presidential campaign of 1800. In that campaign, he opposed Thomas Jefferson because he feared that Jef179
ferson would be too close with Congress. In other words, for
Marshall, it was critically important for each branch of the government to operate independently. The idea of one acting as a
rubber stamp for another, as often seems to happen in the war
on terror, would seem problematic-perhaps problematic
enough to warrant the third branch in stepping up to serve as a
check to the other two.
On the other hand, there are also some potential negatives
to the Court stepping in to check an imperious President and
compliant Congress. First, it is not clear where or whether this
model-imperiousness spawned by imperiousness-ever ends. If
one branch repeatedly asserts greater power in response to other
branches' assertions, all of the branches may eventually end up
incredibly powerful. Of course, it is possible that the existence of
powerful branches counteracting powerful branches might render the government as a whole impotent, rather than powerful.
But it could also result in a federal government that Is, as a

disagreed). with id. at 356 (noting President Nixon's compliance with Court's order to
comply with subpoena). For a detailed discussion of the concept of constitutional crises.
see Jack M. Balkin. Constitutional Hardball and Constitutional Crises. 26 QUINNIPIAC L.
REV. 579 (2008).
178. See HART & WECHSLER. supra note 10. at 342 ("'[T]he existence of congressional power of unspecified scope [may] contribute to the maintenance of a desirable
tension between Court and Congress.").
179. See JAMES F. SIMON. WHAT KIND OF NATION 138-172 (2003).
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whole, quite powerful, a problematic prospect for those concerned about federal power generally.
Second, the way in which the Court has asserted its powerby proclaiming principles that limit Congress's ability to stop its
own exercise of power-raises the specter of an out-of-control
court. Remember the whole justification for the Court's assertion of its power: Someone must limit the political branches or
they will exercise unlimited power. But who will limit the power
10
of the judiciary? " One might argue that we need not fear this
"least dangerous branch," which generally needs the help of
another branch to implement its will. 1" 1 But in opinions like
Boumediene. the Court hardly looks weak.
On balance, it is difficult to say whether Boumediene is a
good decision. My personal inclination at this point is positive.
There is no doubt that presidential power-or at least claimed
presidential power-has expanded with the war on terror. 182 It is
far from clear to me that Congress has the stomach to serve as a
meaningful check on that power. And the likelihood of Congress
serving as a meaningful check is further reduced by the fact that
many if not most of the targets of expanded presidential power
are members of unpopular minority groups who may not have
much influence with Congress. 183 At times like this, I draw comfort from the idea of a powerful court serving as a check on executive power. But that may be simply because I do not particularly fear out of control judicial power at this point in history.
Put differently, how one reacts to the prospect of a bold
court may come down to the question of whom one fears most.
Those who fear an out-of-control executive (and fear that a
weak Congress will not have the backbone or ability to limit the
President) will likely cheer the arrival of an assertive judiciary. ~<~
1

180. See Cary v. Curtis. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845) ("To deny [Congress's power to
control jurisdiction] would be to elevate the judicial over the legislative branch of the
government. and to give to the former powers limited by its own discretion merely.").
quoted in Hart. supra note 13. at 1366-71.
181. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
182. See, e.g.. Balkin. supra note 177. at 583 ("President Bush pushed hard for an
increase in presidential power. greater secrecy. and limited accountability for the Executive. arguing that these changes were necessary to fight the global war on terror.").
183. See Claus. supra note 13. at 62 (noting particular danger when jurisdictionstripping is directed against minorities).
184. See, e.g .. Geoffrey S. Corn. Boumediene v. Bush and the Role of the Courts in
the War on Terror: The Intersection of Hyperbole, Military Necessity, and Judicial Review.
43 New ENG. L. REV .. (forthcoming 2009). In fact. some commentators have criticized the
Court for not going far enough; for focusing on issues of its own power as opposed to the
rights of those detained. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 3. at I.
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On the other hand, those who fear unaccountable and out-oftouch judges micromanaging the war on terror will likely loathe
a decision such as Boumediene. Pick your evil.
CONCLUSION
Although it was a habeas case, Boumediene has a great deal
to say about jurisdiction-stripping. The separation of powers
principles deployed in that case suggest significant limits on
Congress's ability to strip jurisdiction from the federal courts in
ways that are not likely limited to habeas cases. And perhaps
more importantly, the Court's willingness to answer these questions and deploy these principles, which it has largely avoided
for ages, may herald the arrival of a Court whose boldness is either (1) is imperious and frightening, (2) is appropriate to match
the imperiousness of the President, or (3) both. It depends on
who you fear most.

